

TRANSFORMING JUNIOR LEADER DEVELOPMENT:  
DEVELOPING THE NEXT GENERATION  
OF PENTATHLETES

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
General Studies

by

KENNETH GEORGE HAYNES, MAJ, USA  
B.S. Electrical Engineering, University of Nevada, Reno, NV 1994

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
2007

Distribution statement  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>			<i>Form Approved</i> <i>OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. <b>PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.</b>				
<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b>		<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> Master's Thesis		<b>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</b> Feb 2007 - Dec 2007
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> Transforming Junior Leader Development: Developing the Next Generation of Pentathletes		<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b>		
		<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b>		
		<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b>		
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> Kenneth George Haynes, MAJ USA		<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b>		
		<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b>		
		<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b>		
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b>  US Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD 100 Stimson Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301		<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>		
<b>9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b>		<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b>		
		<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b>		
<b>12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b>  Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited				
<b>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b>				
<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> <p>Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom arguably demonstrated that the US Army dominates conventional conflict. This lethal capability of US forces was forged against a Cold War threat focusing on combined fires, swift military defeat of the enemy, and restaging forces to home stations. This model, rehearsed to perfection at the Combat Training Centers, developed highly capable warfighters. This did little to prepare the Army or its leadership for the decidedly non-conventional environments as presented in current operations.</p> <p>The convergence of Full Spectrum Operations, Network Centric Warfare, and Krulak's "Three Block War" have facilitated an urgent need for junior leaders that are more capable, adaptive, and mature in their abilities to lead in a fluid environment. Unlike previous conflicts, inexperienced junior leaders make daily tactical decisions that can have an impact on the success and direction of national and operational strategy.</p> <p>Junior officer education continues to focus almost exclusively on warfighting and branch specialization. It is imperative that the Army begins a generational transformation of the junior officer educational system that empowers the newest leaders to think creatively, in context with national strategy, possess adaptability, and effectively deal with ambiguity.</p>				
<b>15. SUBJECT TERMS</b>				
<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b>			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b>	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b>
<b>a. REPORT</b> Unclassified	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b> Unclassified	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b> Unclassified	UU	135
			<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b>	
			<b>19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)</b>	

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Kenneth George Haynes

Thesis Title: Transforming Junior Leader Development: Developing The Next  
Generation Of Pentathletes

Approved by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Thesis Committee Chair  
Dr. Ralph O. Doughty, Ph.D.

\_\_\_\_\_, Member  
Mr. Kevin P. Shea, M.A.

\_\_\_\_\_, Member  
LTC Leonard E. Verhaeg, MMAS

Accepted this 14th day of December 2007 by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Director, Graduate Degree Programs  
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

1. Certification Date: 14 December 2007
2. Thesis Author: Kenneth George Haynes
3. Thesis Title: Transforming Junior Leader Development: Developing The Next Generation Of Pentathletes

4. Thesis Committee Members:

Signatures:

5. Distribution Statement: See distribution statements A-X on reverse, then circle appropriate distribution statement letter code below:

(A) B C D E F X SEE EXPLANATION OF CODES ON REVERSE

If your thesis does not fit into any of the above categories or is classified, you must coordinate with the classified section at CARL.

6. Justification: Justification is required for any distribution other than described in Distribution Statement A. All or part of a thesis may justify distribution limitation. See limitation justification statements 1-10 on reverse, then list, below, the statement(s) that applies (apply) to your thesis and corresponding chapters/sections and pages. Follow sample format shown below:

### EXAMPLE

<u>Limitation Justification Statement</u>	/	<u>Chapter/Section</u>	/	<u>Page(s)</u>
Direct Military Support (10)	/	Chapter 3	/	12
Critical Technology (3)	/	Section 4	/	31
Administrative Operational Use (7)	/	Chapter 2	/	13-32

Fill in limitation justification for your thesis below:

<u>Limitation Justification Statement</u>	/	<u>Chapter/Section</u>	/	<u>Page(s)</u>
_____	/	_____	/	_____
_____	/	_____	/	_____
_____	/	_____	/	_____
_____	/	_____	/	_____
_____	/	_____	/	_____

7. MMAS Thesis Author's Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. (Documents with this statement may be made available or sold to the general public and foreign nationals).

STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only (insert reason and date ON REVERSE OF THIS FORM). Currently used reasons for imposing this statement include the following:

1. Foreign Government Information. Protection of foreign information.
2. Proprietary Information. Protection of proprietary information not owned by the U.S. Government.
3. Critical Technology. Protection and control of critical technology including technical data with potential military application.
4. Test and Evaluation. Protection of test and evaluation of commercial production or military hardware.
5. Contractor Performance Evaluation. Protection of information involving contractor performance evaluation.
6. Premature Dissemination. Protection of information involving systems or hardware from premature dissemination.
7. Administrative/Operational Use. Protection of information restricted to official use or for administrative or operational purposes.
8. Software Documentation. Protection of software documentation - release only in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7930.2.
9. Specific Authority. Protection of information required by a specific authority.
10. Direct Military Support. To protect export-controlled technical data of such military significance that release for purposes other than direct support of DoD-approved activities may jeopardize a U.S. military advantage.

STATEMENT C: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to DoD and U.S. DoD contractors only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT E: Distribution authorized to DoD only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

STATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by (controlling DoD office and date), or higher DoD authority. Used when the DoD originator determines that information is subject to special dissemination limitation specified by paragraph 4-505, DoD 5200.1-R.

STATEMENT X: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and private individuals of enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.25; (date). Controlling DoD office is (insert).

## ABSTRACT

TRANSFORMING JUNIOR LEADER DEVELOPMENT: DEVELOPING THE NEXT GENERATION OF PENTATHLETES by MAJ Kenneth G. Haynes, 135 pages.

Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom arguably demonstrated that the US Army dominates conventional conflict. This lethal capability of US forces was forged against a Cold War threat focusing on combined fires, swift military defeat of the enemy, and restaging forces to home stations. This model, rehearsed to perfection at the Combat Training Centers, developed highly capable warfighters. This did little to prepare the Army or its leadership for the decidedly non-conventional environments as presented in current operations.

The convergence of Full Spectrum Operations, Network Centric Warfare, and Krulak's "Three Block War" have facilitated an urgent need for junior leaders that are more capable, adaptive, and mature in their abilities to lead in a fluid environment. Unlike previous conflicts, inexperienced junior leaders make daily tactical decisions that can have an impact on the success and direction of national and operational strategy.

Junior officer education continues to focus almost exclusively on warfighting and branch specialization. It is imperative that the Army begins a generational transformation of the junior officer educational system that empowers the newest leaders to think creatively, in context with national strategy, possess adaptability, and effectively deal with ambiguity.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

If I do my full duty, the rest will take care of itself.

GEN George Patton

The assistance, mentoring, expertise, and support of many people enabled the successful production of this paper. It seemed, at times, to be an insurmountable task; but their continued advice and encouragement provided the motivation to drive on. My humblest gratitude and thanks belong to the thesis committee: Dr. Ralph Doughty, Mr. Kevin Shea, and LTC Leonard Verhaeg. Their insightfulness, wisdom, and professional zeal focused my efforts which led to a product with a surprising result.

A special thanks belongs to COL William Raymond and the rest of his MMAS study group. COL Raymond's boundless energy, steady deadlines, and thoughtful interaction with the group helped greatly in resurfacing a desire and need to write, re-write and to write well! And, Mrs. Joanne Knight, the Senior Reference Librarian at the Combined Arms Research Library, enabled me to focus on the writing. She simply worked magic assisting me to find relevant research material and she is an unsung hero of the library staff.

And finally, the largest and deepest thanks belong to my beautiful wife, Lori, for her patience and support during the most trying of times. Whenever the "easy-out" presented itself to us, Lori selflessly pressed me to continue and we found a way to balance it all and came out stronger for it. Thank you.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE .....	ii
CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT .....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vii
ACRONYMS.....	x
ILLUSTRATIONS .....	xi
TABLES .....	xii
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION .....	1
General.....	1
Shifts in Junior Leader Responsibility .....	2
Transformation.....	4
Summary .....	7
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW .....	10
Contemporary Definitions and Expectations .....	11
Historical Context .....	12
Doctrine and Trends.....	14
Institutional Training and Education .....	16
Corporate Solutions .....	18
Summary .....	18
CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .....	20
General.....	20
Research Model Development.....	21
Educational Objectives .....	21
Domain Traits .....	22
“Pentathlete Development Model” .....	24
Summary .....	27
CHAPTER 4. ANALYSIS.....	28



General.....	28
In Search of the Pentathlete .....	29
A Historical and Contemporary Basis .....	29
Contemporary Thought.....	33
Doctrine.....	36
Education of Junior Officers.....	40
General.....	40
Officer Foundation Standards System .....	41
Basic Officer Leadership Course .....	43
BOLC Phase 1 – pre-commissioning.....	44
BOLC Phase 2 – Common Experience.....	54
BOLC Phase 3 – Branch Training .....	56
Functional Training.....	57
Captain’s Career Course .....	58
Leader Education in Industry.....	58
Pentathlete Attributes, Skills, and Competencies .....	64
Meta-competencies .....	64
Army Leader .....	68
Aware Leader.....	71
Versatile Leader .....	72
Pentathlete Defined.....	74
Infusion of New Competencies into the Army Leader Development Model .....	75
Institutional .....	76
Operational.....	78
Self-Development .....	80
Extra-Domain Development .....	83
CHAPTER 5. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....	92
General.....	92
Recommendations to Update Doctrine .....	93
Recommendations for BOLC .....	95
Recommendations for Continuing Education.....	100
Recommendations for additional research.....	103
Summary and Conclusion .....	105
GLOSSARY .....	107
APPENDIX A COMPTENCY CROSS-WALK OF FM 6-22 AND AR 600-100 .....	110
APPENDIX B META-COMPETENCY DEFINITIONS .....	111
APPENDIX C DA PAM 350-58 EXTRACT, APPENDIX B .....	112
APPENDIX D AR 600-100 EXTRACT .....	113
APPENDIX E BOLC TASK LIST AS OF MARCH 2007 .....	114

BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	117
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .....	123

## ACRONYMS

AR	Army Regulation
ATLDP	The Army Training and Leader Development Panel
BOLC	Basic Officer Leadership Course
CLDS	Cadet Leader Development System
COE	Contemporary Operating Environment
CPS	Cadet Performance Score
CQ	Cultural Intelligence
DA	Department of the Army
EQ	Emotional Intelligence
FM	Field Manual
MiTT	Military Transition Team
OFS	Officer Foundation Standards System
OML	Order of Merit List
OMS	Order of Merit Score
PAM	Department of the Army Pamphlet
MQS	Military Qualification Standards
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
SOF	Special Operations Forces
TRADOC	United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
USMA	United States Military Academy (aka West Point)
USAAC	United States Army Accession Command
USMC	United States Marine Corps

## ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. Cognitive Levels and Army Education .....	17
Figure 2. Bloom's Taxonomy.....	21
Figure 3. Army Leader Development Model.....	22
Figure 4. Army Leader Development and Bloom's Taxonomy Crosswalk.....	23
Figure 5. Army Leader Development Model, Bloom's Taxonomy, and Junior Officers Crosswalk.....	24
Figure 6. Knowledge Foundations.....	25
Figure 7. Determining Attribute and Skill Levels .....	26
Figure 8. "Pentathlete" Development Model .....	26
Figure 9. BOLC Model .....	44
Figure 10. The 4-year USMA Cadet Development Program .....	48
Figure 11. Leadership Meta-competencies .....	64
Figure 12. Objective Junior Leader Competencies.....	68
Figure 13. Objective Leader Metacompetencies .....	95

## TABLES

	Page
Table 1. Trainability Continuum for Adaptability Traits.....	35
Table 2. Human Terrain System Impacts .....	36
Table 3. BOLC Phase 2 prioritization of training tasks, March 2007 .....	55
Table 4. Managers vs. Leaders .....	59
Table 5. “Incubator” mentorship program.....	61
Table 6. The Pentathlete Leader .....	75
Table 7. Recommended Pentathlete Definition .....	94
Table 8. Recommendations for ROTC .....	96
Table 9. A Recommend Leader Development Portfolio Instrument .....	102
Table 10. Recommendations for Encouragement of Continuing Education .....	103

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

We now must cover a broader piece of the entire spectrum of operations, and because we have a force that is going to face challenges that will be dynamic and will move across the various challenges on the spectrum, we'll need people that are learning and adaptive.

GEN Peter J. Schoomaker<sup>1</sup>

#### General

Newly anointed platoon leaders are today thrust into the contemporary operating environments of Iraq and Afghanistan and transform, in a crucible learning experience, into tactically adaptable leaders.<sup>2</sup> They are young leaders who are recognized to directly impact the success and direction of operations<sup>3</sup>. They are commissioned, receive institutionally based service branch training, and face the daunting task of receiving on-the-job training in a combat environment. Platoon leaders are decisive points that influence the outcome of operations at the tactical and maneuver level of warfare. However, this tactically centric role of junior officer leadership is changing. It is increasingly apparent that the actions of these leaders can also influence the operational and strategic levels of warfare. Platoon leaders and Soldiers are challenged to make decisions for the sake of tactical simplicity that may have far reaching impacts beyond their immediate tactical environment.

The United States Army's leader training and educational systems recently renewed emphasis on basic "war-fighting" skills and implemented graduate level educational initiatives for both mid-level and senior-level leaders. However, there has been little significant change to the junior officer development process enabling them to

become well-rounded Army leaders later in their careers. Training emphasis continues to be placed on branch specific proficiencies and little attention is given to educating the complexities of full spectrum operations until much later in an officer's career. The Army must adopt means to develop a greater breadth of skills and cognitive reasoning in its junior leaders now. This paper will determine the educational and training focus areas that the Army needs to integrate into the leader development process that will stimulate the transformation of junior officers into the well-rounded leaders needed in the current and future contemporary operating environments of the Global War on Terrorism.

### Shifts in Junior Leader Responsibility

The transformational imperative for junior officers is an important topic to discuss and it is important to conceptualize why. The vignette below, from Operation Iraqi Freedom, illustrates the impact of the shifting dynamic from a tactical to a tactical-strategic centricity in the application of military force at the platoon level:

The day of April 9<sup>th</sup> 2003, in Firdus Square, Baghdad was a memorable day. Triumphantly, United States Soldiers and Marines had entered Baghdad and were located in front of the Palestine Hotel where most journalists had co-located for safety. Crowds of jubilant Iraqis surrounded the battle weary troops. In the center of the square, a large bronze statue of Saddam Hussein quickly became the prized target for both groups. An armored recovery vehicle was brought in and an excited young Marine climbed up the boom to tie a chain noose around Saddam's neck. They were going to drag it down to the dirt! The crowd screamed at a fever pitch and was excited to erase this vestige of tyranny from the square. Then, inexplicitly, the crowd collectively gasped at what they saw at the top the boom. The happy crowd's mood had noticeably changed and some angry shouts could be heard. There, in front of the Iraqis and live television cameras from news centers around the world, a lone Marine placed the United States flag on top of Saddam's face. The United States, in a heartbeat, transformed from an Army of Liberation to an Army of Occupation in the minds of the Muslim community. Without forethought to their actions, these young Marines inflicted a wound to the strategic aim and resolve of the United States to win widespread support in the Muslim world.<sup>4</sup>

Indeed, young leaders are facing a complex battle-space. In Firdus Square, a combat support platoon suddenly became engaged in a decidedly non-tactical event that had a global reach and influenced the national objective of the United States to “win-the-hearts and minds” of the Muslim world. This example demonstrates two important lessons. First, leaders at all levels are affected. The requirement for the well-rounded, adaptable leader is not confined to a combat leader. Secondly, the use of mass communication technologies can shape the perceptions of the outcome of events worldwide with impunity.

Leaders who successfully adapt to this shifting paradigm of battlefield responsibilities are often referred to as the “strategic corporal”<sup>5</sup> and “strategic lieutenant.” In addition to being proficient at conventional tactical warfare, the strategic corporal is adaptive to combat irregular threats, terrorism, or insurgencies. The strategic corporal is not a strategic leader. This is an important distinction. Strategic leaders are senior Army leaders who *influence* the strategic environment while leading at the strategic level of military operations. The “strategic corporal,” on the other hand, is an individual who *affects* the strategic environment through actions while executing the tactical level of military operations. The strategic corporal understands and can conceptualize the principles of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, economic, finance, and law enforcement) within his tactical sphere of influence. In short, the strategic corporal is the transformation of leadership skill sets from a tactician to a tactician-strategist-economist-politician.



## Transformation

The Department of Defense is rapidly transforming organizations and equipment to meet the challenges of both conventional and irregular warfare. In fact, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review's (QDR) vision for Joint Ground Forces calls for a shift of traditionally Special Operations Forces missions to modular and joint forces. It recognizes the leadership challenge associated with this transformational change:

The result will be a new breed of warrior able to move more easily between *disparate mission sets* while preserving their *depth of skill in primary specialties*. Future warriors will be as *proficient in irregular operations, including counterinsurgency and stabilization operations, as they are today in high-intensity combat*.<sup>6</sup> [emphasis added]

This transformational vision is intended to free up Special Operations Forces to conduct tasks that are more complex. However, the QDR goes on to add that future warriors are autonomous, understand foreign cultures, and possess the ability to train, mentor, and advise foreign forces.

Recognizing that the leaders of today (and the future) must be multi-dimensional and adaptive, former Chief of Staff of the Army General Peter J. Schoomaker coined the term “pentathlete.”<sup>7</sup> Intended to describe a highly skilled, professional officer, the term pentathlete became a largely thematic buzzword symbolizing a wunderkind: a “jack-of-all-trades who is an expert at them all.” In terms of leadership, transformation, and vision for future Army forces becoming this wunderkind is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to do. The reader must make the distinction that the pentathlete is a highly capable officer over a variety of competencies and is definitely not a superhero.

The concept of the pentathlete was adopted in the 2007 Army Posture Statement and currently stands as the second of four interrelated transformation strategies for the

United States Army. By definition, the strategy “Train and Equip Soldiers and Grow Adaptive Leaders” defines the need for pentathlete leaders in the United States Army as “developing our leaders to serve as multi-skilled pentathletes able to thrive amidst complexity and uncertainty.”<sup>8</sup> Unfortunately, the Army Posture Statement does little to define the specifics of what these leaders need to know or how to develop these leaders.

Platoon leaders and sergeants of today are beneficiaries of a training and education program perfected to face the Cold War Soviet threat. This system was constructed based on a large conventional (symmetrical) force-on-force engagement. The lethality of United States forces were forged from fires of the intensive collective training at the National Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center, and Combat Maneuver Training Center. United States forces also learned how to combine fires, militarily defeat the enemy, and quickly restage home. Focus on these capstone events resulted in a training focus where the ubiquitous “task, condition, standard” became the norm. Combat operations surpassed considerations for support, stability, and peace operations. Leaders simply did not have to think or adapt, they merely had to follow the checklist and apply some basic leadership skills.<sup>9</sup>

However, today’s threat is decidedly non-conventional. As current operations in Iraq show, it is inadequate to only prepare for and fight the symmetrical combat opponent. Leaders must also be well versed in the concepts of irregular warfare, stability operations, counter-insurgency operations, and (contrary to Army culture) nation building. Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, states:

Developing mature judgment and cunning requires a rigorous regimen of preparation that begins before deployment and continues throughout. *Junior*

*leaders especially need these skills* in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment because of the decentralized nature of operations.<sup>10</sup> [emphasis added]

The reader must assume that this calls for the leader to move from the realm of application to analysis and synthesis. This leader mandate ultimately requires a shift from training a checklist of core tasks to educating the concepts.

The quantity of education opportunities has diminished over the last 20 years. During the 1980s, the average officer basic course length was 36 weeks in length.<sup>11</sup> However, after the success of Operation Desert Storm, the dramatic reduction in the size of the force, budgetary constraints, and congressionally mandated officer distribution programs resulted in a curtailment in the quantity and quality of institutionalized education. By 1998, the average officer basic course was a mere 18 weeks long.<sup>12</sup> The ability of officers to learn through repetition, thought, and reflection are virtually non-existent and an over emphasis on “task, condition, standard” training and on-the-job training permeated the leadership development cycle.

Today, a modest effort to develop pentathlete skills is directed at the mid-grade officers and senior NCOs. One example is the Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) that are specifically identified as groups that require pentathlete skills in their mission environment. Comprised mostly of mid and senior grade leaders, each ten-person MiTT team receives 60-days of cultural and cross-functional training before deployment. However, these seasoned leaders have been applying their branch specific tradecraft for between 8 to 15 years. How quickly can one expect these leaders, practiced at their branch specific trade, to transform into a pentathlete and can one realistically expect this to be a catalyst for a generational and transformational change in the Army? Will the lessons learned survive the remaining five years of a typical officer’s career? Will the

lessons learned be passed on during the influx of the “millennial” generation into the officer corps? The continued practice of targeting mid to senior-grade officers runs the risk of never fully adopting the change required to make a change of culture a long-term institutional reality.

Generational change in the officer corps requires an effort to begin the development of the pentathlete like skills into the future Army leaders at an early stage. To facilitate this, a new focus and emphasis must be placed in the education program and foundations for life-long learning during the initial leadership developmental phases of the junior-most leaders. Benjamin Bloom, a leading educational psychologist, determined that mastery learning is accomplished through the obtainment of 6 distinct cognitive levels. An examination of FM 7-0, *Training the Force*, shows that only Level III (application of knowledge) of Bloom’s cognitive learning levels are reached using current doctrine<sup>13</sup>. Emerging doctrine, such as FM 3-0 (Operations: Full Spectrum Operations) and FM 3-24 (Counterinsurgency), is showing a requirement for leaders that possess the higher cognitive abilities of Bloom’s Level IV (analysis) and V (synthesis). A paradigm shift in doctrine is occurring and the Army’s leader development system must catch up.

### Summary

Additional institutional qualification courses are impractical due to the demands of the Global War on Terror; however, additions to existing institutional training, operational based learning, and self-development programs should be implemented. Knowledge about the application of operational and strategic concepts at a tactical level will enable the junior leaders to most suitably adapt to the irregular environment. An

officer who is cognitively aware of the second and third order effects of tactical decisions is more likely to positively impact operational and strategic goals and objectives.

What would the outcome of 9 April 2003 in Firdus Square have been had that young Marine hoisted an Iraqi flag first? Or an Iraqi flag alongside a United States flag? This thesis will determine the educational and training focus areas and methods that the Army needs to integrate into the existing leader development process. These foci, once integrated into the Army culture, can serve as a foundation that will stimulate a generational transformation of Army leaders. The well-rounded junior officers needed in the contemporary operating environments of today are the operational and strategic leaders of tomorrow. The following chapters discuss the literature review, research methodology, analysis of findings, and provide recommendations for improvement.

---

<sup>1</sup>SGT Sara Wood, *Soldiers Must Be Adaptive for Future, Army Chief Says* [Interview] (22 Feb 2006, accessed 11 March 2007); available from [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2006/20060221\\_4263.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2006/20060221_4263.html)

<sup>2</sup> Leonard Wong, "Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom," ed. Strategic Studies Institute (U.S. Army War College, 2004).

<sup>3</sup> LTG David H. Petraeus, "Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq," *Military Review Special Edition, Counterinsurgency Reader* October 2007 (2006).

<sup>4</sup> MAJ Kenneth G. Haynes, original composition from personal unpublished war journal, circa May 2003.

<sup>5</sup> GEN Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," *Marines Corps Gazette* 83, no. 1 (1999).

<sup>6</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld and et. al., *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* [Internet] (2006, accessed 6 February 2006); available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf>. 42.

<sup>7</sup> Wood.

<sup>8</sup> Francis J. Harvey and GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army* (1 February 2007 accessed 5 May 2007); available from <http://www.army.mil/aps/>. V.

<sup>9</sup> The stunning success of Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom would seem to vindicate that the checklist method of training bears merit. However, it did little to prepare leaders for post-combat stability or counterinsurgency operations.

<sup>10</sup> *FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency*, U.S. Dept. of the Army Field Manual [FM] (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2006), paragraph 7.

<sup>11</sup> LTC Kelly C. Jordan, "The Yin and Yang of Junior Officer Learning: the Historical Development of the Army's Institutional Education Program for Captains," *AUSA Land Warfare Papers* 49 (2004): 23.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*: 17.

<sup>13</sup> Benjamin S. Bloom, *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: The Classification of Educational Goals: Handbook I, Cognitive Domain* (New York: Longmans, 1956). Bloom's levels (I-Knowledge, II-Comprehension, III-Application, IV-Analysis, V-Synthesis, and VI- Evaluation) are considered the fundamental and sequential concepts of educational learning.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

“Powell's Rules for Picking People”- Look for intelligence, judgment, and, most critically, a capacity to anticipate, to see around corners. Also look for loyalty, integrity, a high energy drive, a balanced ego and the drive to get things done.

attributed to GEN Collin Powell<sup>1</sup>

#### General

Presently, there exists a great volume of reports, reviews, essays, and analyses that reiterate the importance of the reliance of adaptable leaders, “strategic corporals,” and pentathletes in the contemporary operating environment (COE). Unfortunately, little discussion has occurred about the development of these leaders, defining the skills that are required of them, or the methods to educate the development of these leadership skills. The purpose of Chapter 2 is to review the major sources of information uncovered and relate their importance to the questions and discussion presented in Chapter 1.

There are six principal questions that focus the literature review. For brevity, this paper will use the term pentathlete to encompass the concepts of the adaptable leader, strategic corporal, and strategic lieutenant.” Each of the focus areas is discussed below: What are the contemporary definitions and expectations of senior Army/Joint leadership for the pentathlete? In what historical context have leaders with pentathlete skills been seen in the post WWII era? What doctrine and trends are motivating the shift to pentathlete skills in our leaders? How has Army institutional education adapted to meet this challenge? What solutions has commercial industry implemented to groom future leaders in similar environments?

## Contemporary Definitions and Expectations

The use of a reference to pentathletes in the military began in earnest in 2006.

The earliest such reference found is from the former Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker, in an interview with the Armed Forces Press Service on 21 February 2006. Discussing the challenges of full spectrum operations in the COE, GEN Schoomaker relates that the pentathlete is skilled in his field but able to perform other functions as the need arises.<sup>2</sup>

Dr. Francis Harvey, former Secretary of the Army, provided an executive voice to the use of pentathlete in the 2006 US Army Command and General Staff College graduation commencement speech:

For the uncertain and unpredictable '21st Century operating environment, we need leaders who are decisive, innovative, adaptive, culturally astute, effective communicators and dedicated to life long learning. We need them to demonstrate character and integrity in everything they do. We need them to be experts in the art and science of the profession of arms as well as be able to lead, manage and change large organizations from both an operational and business perspective. They must excel in the political skills of governance, Statesmanship and diplomacy. They must be strategic and creative thinkers; they must build teams; they must boldly confront uncertainty; and they must solve complex problems while engendering loyalty and trust. In short, Army leaders in this century need to be *pentathletes, multi-skilled leaders* who can thrive in uncertain and complex operating environments.<sup>3</sup> [emphasis added]

In this speech, Secretary Harvey was calling on the audience to begin efforts to “change the way we develop Army leaders in the future.”<sup>4</sup> His remarks do not bear the weight of official policy but they do provide a clear intent and guidance for a transformational process to begin.

As noted in Chapter 1, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review determined a need for traditional ground combat forces to assume roles that are more joint focused and multi-capable. It specifically addresses the need to transform leadership by increasing



their depth of knowledge and abilities. The 2007 Army Posture Statement, written by Secretary Harvey and GEN Schoomaker, formally placed pentathlete in the Army lexicon. Senior military leaders and thinkers have written extensively in the last few years calling on the need to develop adaptable leaders. Other sources that will be researched for this thesis include the Army War College, the US Army Research Institute, and the Strategic Studies Institute.

### Historical Context

The USMC identified in the late 1990s a convergence of simultaneous high-intensity combat intermixed with peacekeeping operations in a compressed operations area. This became known as the “Three Block War” concept. Fundamentally, the “Three Block War” is typically a dynamic urban area locked in a cyclic pattern of escalation to de-escalation based on micro-social stressors. As a result, small unit leaders are placed in situations of continuous adaptation and change while still executing the mission of his/her unit.

Also, in the 1990s, the Department of Defense identified the need to capitalize on recent technological growth to sustain capabilities during the post-Operation Desert Storm force reductions. A fundamental process, Network Centric Warfare, began to transform defense organizations into leaner, more capable units. An example of Network Centric Warfare is the fusion of intelligence processes using computer and network technology allowing a soldier to identify a target, giving his headquarters the ability to analyze the target, and tasking the appropriate system to destroy the target in real time. Network Centric Warfare is a concept under continuous use and refinement in the COE

of Iraq. Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is focused on the individual's contribution in the COE.

The changing operating environment is also noted among emerging military thinkers. USMC MAJ James E. Szepesy postulates in his 2005 Tufts University thesis<sup>5</sup> that the concurrent development of the "Three Block War" and Network Centric Warfare has precipitated a reliance on the "strategic corporal" in the COE. Szepesy uses the 31 March 2004 assault of Fallujah, Iraq, as a case study to examine effects of the "strategic corporal" in combat:

At the center of this nexus between the Three Block War and Network Centric Warfare was the small unit leader. *This small unit leader, primarily focused on tactical success, nonetheless had strategic implications.* Overall success depended on success at the tactical level. Mistakes and miscalculations at the tactical level could jeopardize overall success. The result is added significance to the concept of the *Strategic Corporal*.<sup>6</sup> [emphasis added]

While his thesis is focused on operations within the USMC, it is applicable to all uniformed services using ground forces in an urban environment.

Robert Kaplan, a noted American journalist and essayist about the nature of U.S. power, is an example of external observer that is aware of the changing leader requirements. His argument in his 2005 book, *Imperial Grunts*, is that the environment of the "strategic corporal" is not new. The Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902 resulted in a similar environment where mid-level officers became localized policymakers obtaining regional and national strategic goals. During this conflict, micro-regions developed cyclic responses to the insurrection and US presence. In each micro-region, mid-level officers were the experts and developed their own counter-insurgency responses best suited for the political, military and cultural situation there.<sup>7</sup>

## Doctrine and Trends

The addition of adaptability as a core task is emerging as a theme in newly published Army doctrine. The core manual for leadership in the US Army is Field Manual (FM) 6-22, Leadership. It defines the doctrine for Army leaders to follow in development of individual and organizational leadership competencies. The expression BE-KNOW-DO is used as a competency model for leaders that represent their character, knowledge, and behavior.

Preparing self and subordinates to lead aims at the goal of developing *multi-skilled leaders—leader pentathletes*. The *adaptable leader* will more readily comprehend the challenges of a constantly evolving strategic environment, demanding not only warfighting skills, but also creativity and a degree of diplomacy combined with multicultural sensitivity. To achieve this balance, the Army creates positive learning environments at all levels to support its lifelong learning strategy.<sup>8</sup> [emphasis added]

Published in October 2006, the 216 page FM 6-22, *Army Leadership*, is the first doctrinal document that uses the word pentathlete. It is used only four times: in GEN(R) Peter Schoomaker's forward, once in an epitaph, and only twice in the text of the manual. FM 6-22 does, however, acknowledge a changing dynamic in the requirements for the abilities of small unit leaders:

The Army *increasingly requires* proficient small unit leaders capable of operating in widely dispersed areas and/or integrated with joint, multinational, special operations forces as well as nongovernmental agencies. These leaders must be *self-aware and adaptive, comfortable with ambiguity, able to anticipate possible second- and third-order effects, and be multifunctional to exploit combined arms integration*.<sup>9</sup> [emphasis added]

There is no discussion regarding the developmental steps, milestones, or assessments of these skills beyond the BE-KNOW-DO model.

Discussing the development of leaders, FM 6-22 makes an attempt to define “leader pentathletes.” The “leader pentathlete” is adaptable, comprehends the strategic

environment, possesses critical combat skills, creativity, is culturally sensitive, and has a degree of diplomacy.<sup>10</sup> There is little emphasis on the “leader pentathlete” model in the remainder of FM 6-22. Additionally, it states only that development of these multi-skilled leaders is part the Army’s “lifelong learning strategy.”<sup>11</sup> It does not define any formal method for developing “leader pentathletes” and leaves it to the individual to identify and seek out self-development for the skills required.

In 2006, the US Army and US Marine Corps jointly published FM 3-24 (also known as MCWP 3-33.5), *Counterinsurgency (COIN)*. This field manual was the first doctrine in 20-years that addressed a doctrinal means to conduct counterinsurgent operations. In the forward for FM 3-24, GEN David Petraeus (US Army) and LTG James Amos (US Marine Corps) link the success of COIN to the quality of the leadership: “Conducting a successful counterinsurgency campaign requires a flexible, adaptive force led by agile, well-informed, culturally astute leaders.”<sup>12</sup> FM 3-24 is directing that leaders become “strategic corporals:”

Successful COIN operations require competence and judgment by Soldiers and Marines at all levels. Indeed, *young leaders*—so-called “*strategic corporals*”—often make decisions at the tactical level that have *strategic consequences*. Senior leaders set the proper direction and climate with thorough training and clear guidance; then they trust their subordinates to do the right thing. *Preparation for tactical-level leaders requires more than just mastering Service doctrine*; they must also be trained and educated to adapt to their local situations, understand the legal and ethical implications of their actions, and exercise initiative and sound judgment in accordance with their senior commanders’ intent.<sup>13</sup> [emphasis added]

The call for adaptable leaders at the tactical level is a recurring theme throughout FM 3-24. Recently published doctrine such as FM 3-0, *Operations*, and AR 600-100, *Army Leadership*, also refers to the pentathlete and adaptable leadership.

### Institutional Training and Education

There exists a critical difference between the spheres of training and education. Training, defined in FM 7-0, *Training the Force*, is “the instruction of personnel to increase their capacity to perform specific military functions and associated individual and collective tasks.”<sup>14</sup> Training involves learning a task, which in turn provides the student with an acquired skill. Education is defined in Army Regulation 350-1, *Army Training and Education*, as “instruction with increased knowledge and skill, and/or experience as the desired outcome for the student.”<sup>15</sup> Education, therefore, is a learning process to acquire adaptable knowledge. Simply put, training seeks to provide the student with a mastery of what is known under specific conditions and education provides the ability to adapt to the unknown.

Benjamin Bloom, a leading educational psychologist, proposed in 1956 a classification of educational objectives in his *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives*. This taxonomy is considered a standard for the quantification of educational goals that students must meet to achieve full cognitive awareness, or mastery, of the subject material. The levels begin with knowledge and progress to comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis and evaluation.<sup>16</sup>

Training, as defined above, falls into Bloom’s first three cognitive levels (I-III) of knowledge, comprehension and application. The last three levels (IV-VI) analysis, synthesis and evaluation correlate to the definition of education. The diagram below (Figure 1) illustrates the inter-relation of the concepts and the competencies of officers in the Army in general:




Figure 1. Cognitive Levels and Army Education

Source: LTC Kelly Jordon, "The Yin and Yang of Junior Officer Learning: the Historical Development of the Army's Institutional Education Program for Captains." (Institute for Land Warfare: Arlington, VA, 2004).

Army doctrine calls for a deliberate leader development process founded in three core domains. These are: 1) institutional training and education, 2) operational experience and on the job training, and 3) self-development.<sup>17</sup> Various sources and methods are intended to provide the officer with a robust learning experience leading them to have "the desire and drive to update their professional knowledge and competencies." FM 6-22 directs the development of leaders to be "self-aware and adaptive, comfortable with ambiguity, able to anticipate possible second- and third-order effects, and be multifunctional to exploit combined arms integration."

### Corporate Solutions

Like the US Army, corporate and private industry also possesses an inherent need to develop future leaders for their organizations. This need is two fold. First, it improves the efficiency and adaptability of the organization as it is today. Secondly, it prepares for the upward movement of executives to operate the organization into the future. The Army, however, is not a profit driven trade. This fact hinders any direct correlation or comparison between the two entities. However, a wealth of knowledge exists in countless book, magazines, and periodicals that discuss the concepts of leader development.

### Summary

The review of relevant literature reveals several pointed factors regarding the emergence of pentathlete like leaders in the US Army. First, there is a historical basis for having officers with the appropriate cognitive skills to affect operations beyond their immediate domain. Second, there is a doctrinal and transformational requirement to develop pentathlete skills in junior officers. And lastly, that the Army's educational system has become training focused and is ignoring historically sound methods to develop these skills in junior officers today. Chapter 3 will discuss the methodology used to analyze the data uncovered in order to conduct the analysis in Chapter 4.

---

<sup>1</sup> Oren Harari, *The Leadership Secrets of Colin Powell* (New York: McGraw Hill, 2002), 167.

<sup>2</sup> Wood.

<sup>3</sup> Francis J. Harvey, *Secretary of the Army Remarks (as prepared) CGSC Graduation Fort Leavenworth, Kan.* (2006, accessed 29 March 2007); available from <http://www.army.mil/-speeches/2006/09/18/161-sa-remarks-as-prepared-cgsc-graduation-fort-leavenworth-kan/>.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> James E. Szepesy, *The Strategic Corporal and the Emerging Battlefield* (Tufts University, 2005, accessed 29 March 2007); available from <http://fletcher.tufts.edu>.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Robert D. Kaplan, *Imperial Grunts: the American Military on the Ground* (New York: Random House, 2005).

<sup>8</sup> *FM 6-22: Leadership*, U.S. Dept. of the Army Field Manual [FM] (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2006), paragraph 8.62.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., paragraph 8.54.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., paragraph 8.62.

<sup>11</sup> Lifelong learning is discussed below in Institutional Education.

<sup>12</sup> *FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency*.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., paragraph 1.157.

<sup>14</sup> *FM 7-0: Training the Force*, U.S. Dept. of the Army Field Manual [FM] (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2002), Glossary.

<sup>15</sup> *AR 350-1; Army Training and Education*, U.S. Dept. of the Army Regulation [AR] (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2003), 126.

<sup>16</sup> Bloom.

<sup>17</sup> *FM 6-22: Leadership*, paragraph 8.53.



## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A leader is a man who can adapt principles to circumstances.

General George S. Patton

#### General

The literature review in Chapter 2 is not an inclusive sampling of the relevant data and discussion about pentathletes or “strategic corporals.” This modest review shows that it is evident that a transformation of leadership is occurring for officers in the Army. It also illustrates that there is a contemporary need to address the development of junior officers earlier in their careers to foster the development of pentathlete skills. This chapter outlines the methodology used to collect, assess, and evaluate the research information collected for this thesis.

A pre-existing model does not exist in which to examine the research data. The nature of the phrases “pentathlete,” “adaptive leaders,” “world-class warriors,” and “strategic corporals” leads to ambiguity that is not clearly defined. In order to assimilate the varied types and quantities of data, it is necessary to define a unique model for the research methodology and analysis. All leader development is rooted in the educational development of the individual officer. Systems and models do exist that define and examine this process for the institutional Army. Outlined below is a methodology developed to bridge these preexisting models with the new requirements to develop the pentathlete leaders of the future.

## Research Model Development

### Educational Objectives

Chapter 2 introduced Benjamin Bloom's Taxonomy of Educational Objectives that classifies educational objectives into six distinct cognitive domains. It is a measure of learned intellectual skills along six distinct levels of thinking behavior. Illustrated below in Figure 2, each level is a degree of difficulty that requires mastery before the next level is achieved. There are six major levels beginning with the simple recall of data (Knowledge) to the mastery of knowledge through judgment about the value of ideas (Evaluation). Bloom's Taxonomy is a useful litmus test model in examining specific skills and educational objectives.




Figure 2. Bloom's Taxonomy

Current Army doctrine of leader development has three interrelated domains: Institutional training and education, operational assignments, and self-development.<sup>1</sup> Individual junior leaders receive rote knowledge through the institutional training and education programs such as the Basic Officer Leadership Course. Operational assignments reinforce and allow the individual to apply the knowledge and, through

repetitive performance, develop deeper knowledge of leadership and operational art. The individual then determines further cognitive development through an application of self-development to achieve goals, improve upon strengths, and reduce weaknesses. Figure 3 below illustrates the Army Leader Development Model defined in AR 600-100 and DA PAM 350-58. This model is intended to be progressive and sequential throughout an officer's career to prepare leaders for increased levels of "responsibility, complexity, and difficulty."<sup>2</sup>




Figure 3. Army Leader Development Model

Source: DA Pamphlet 350-58, *Leader Development for America's Army* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1994). Page 2.

### Domain Traits

A linkage exists between the cognitive development process of Bloom's Taxonomy and the Army Leader Development Model. *Knowledge* and *Comprehension* are most represented in the Leader Development Model by the Institutional Training and

Education domains. The Operational Assignments domain continues to introduce individuals to new knowledge and adds the dimension of *Application* and *Analysis*. Full cognitive learning through *Synthesis* and *Evaluation* is left largely up to the individual leader and is not a formal process in the Leader Development Model. Figure 4 illustrates this relationship between the Leader Development Model and cognitive development.




Figure 4. Army Leader Development and Bloom's Taxonomy Crosswalk

The relationships in Figure 4 do not account for the inexperience that many junior officers possess. It is not valid to presume that a newly commissioned officer has the breadth of experience to absorb new knowledge and rapidly expand his understanding to the evaluation level. Development of junior officers begins in the pre-commissioning processes, continues with formal Officer Education System training and education, and provides application through common operational assignments. Figure 5 illustrates the relationship of the Army Leader Development Model with Bloom's Taxonomy for junior officers.




Figure 5. Army Leader Development Model, Bloom's Taxonomy, and Junior Officers Crosswalk

### “Pentathlete Development Model”

As Chapter 2 shows, there is a vast amount of ambiguous material calling for leadership transformation, doctrinal paradigm shifts, and tactical reliance on small unit leadership in on-going operations. It is therefore necessary to conceptualize a construct of required pentathlete attributes that junior leaders require before an analysis can be applied. This first step requires a review of relevant published material to define a contemporary example of a junior pentathlete and the minimum attributes and skills the pentathlete requires to be successful. Using Bloom’s model, this defines the rote *Knowledge* level of the pentathlete subject material to better apply further analysis (Figure 6).



Figure 6. Knowledge Foundations

The second step of the methodology model involves a prioritization of these results. As seen in Figure 6 above, development of junior officers begins in the pre-commissioning phase with the *Knowledge* cognitive domain. Therefore, there must be a rote-learning period of pentathlete attributes and skills that leads to future application and synthesis of those pentathlete skills. Prioritizations of these minimum attributes will aide in determining what attributes and skills should be the focus for junior officers.

Additionally, a properly prioritized list will parallel Bloom's Taxonomy and allow identification of when pentathlete skills are best adopted by junior officers. Figure 7 illustrates this genesis.




Figure 7. Determining Attribute and Skill Levels

The final step involves a comparison of current Junior Officer Development foci with the prioritized list of Pentathlete Development foci from step 2. This comparison serves two purposes. First, it identifies gaps in the existing developmental domains where the addition of pentathlete focus should occur. Second, it identifies a framework development model that can be applied using the existing Army Leader Development Model. Figure 8 Illustrates this final step.




Figure 8. "Pentathlete" Development Model

## Summary

A great deal of material exists that discuss the development of leaders within and outside the Army. The Pentathlete Development Model is the foundation for the evaluation and analysis of research material. It allows a focus into the areas of competencies that would enable an individual to develop the pentathlete skills without becoming distracted by the examination of counterinsurgency and other non-conventional conflicts. In the following chapters, this thesis will examine, in detail, research data and define a model for junior officer development.

---

<sup>1</sup> *AR 600-100; Army Leadership*, U.S. Dept. of the Army Regulation [AR] (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2007), 5.

<sup>2</sup> *DA PAM 350-58: Leader Development for America's Army*, Department of the Army Pamphlet [DA PAM] (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1994), 2.



## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

I would say that most leaders are made. A fellow that comes from a long line of ancestors with determination and courage has no doubt inherited some leadership qualities. I have seen many times in combat where somebody who is small and meek was given the opportunity and had leadership you never before realized he had, and he becomes a Medal of Honor winner. There are some qualities you inherit that make you a good leader; but many who have not these qualities develop them, or just seem to come up with them when opportunity knocks.

GEN Dwight Eisenhower

#### General

The foundation of knowledge available on the topics of leadership is seemingly limitless. There is no shortage of lists, theories, and diagrams to map out a model of a perceived perfect leader. This endless data, taken in whole, is not only all encompassing but the data is too voluminous to be of any practical benefit. However, there are undercurrents of common themes, dimensions, attributes and skills that once culled are extraordinarily revealing.

Chapter 3 described the framework of the Pentathlete Development Model used to evaluate the research material. The findings of this research, an analysis of these findings and summary of the key points are described below. Detailed conclusions, recommendations for additional research, and recommendation for implementation to the research questions are presented in Chapter 5.

For most men, the matter of learning is one of professional preference. But for Army officer, the obligation to learn, to grow in their profession, is clearly a public duty.

- General Omar Bradley

### In Search of the Pentathlete

#### A Historical and Contemporary Basis

Secretary Francis Harvey defined pentathletes to be multi-skilled leaders of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century “recognizing diversity and displaying self-control, balance, and stability in all situations.”<sup>1</sup> To a contemporary audience this is a calling of the times; however, it is hardly a new concept since there exists a historical precedence for the use of such leaders in our nation’s history. One does not need to look very hard in an elementary school book to find an example of such Army leaders. Captains Merriwether Lewis and William Clark set off on a two-year expedition of exploration in 1804. In a secret letter to Congress President Jefferson wrote:

*An intelligent officer, with ten or twelve chosen men, fit for the enterprise... might explore the whole line, even to the Western Ocean, have conferences with the natives on the subject of commercial intercourse, get admission among them for our traders, as others are admitted, agree on convenient deposits for an interchange of articles, and return with the information acquired, in the course of two summers.*<sup>2</sup> [emphasis added]

Lewis and Clark epitomize the attributes of “decisive, innovative, adaptive, culturally astute, [and] effective communicators”<sup>3</sup> that Secretary Harvey called for in the officer corps of today.

The historical context of the frontier does little, though, to fully describe the role the Army has in modern times. The 20<sup>th</sup> Century saw the rise of the United States as a world power and with it came a variety of missions tasked to the Army. Among these is

constabulary, diplomatic, humanitarian, nation building, irregular warfare, and civil support. Andrew Birtle's two-volume history of counterinsurgency and contingency operations highlights the fact that the US has spent more time conducting non-conventional missions than conventional ones.<sup>4</sup> A cursory review of Army History up to Vietnam shows many stability operations: the Revolutionary War, Civil War, Post-Civil War, Spanish-American War, and Philippine Insurrection to name just a few.

The most successful examples of non-conventional operations are the post-war occupations of Germany and Japan following World War II and the transformation of those societies. The Army had discovered, over the course of the war, that civilian agencies were incapable of restoring basic governmental services at a pace that would support continued military operations. The Army learned how to reestablish law, order, and governmental services. These lessons learned facilitated the occupations of Japan and Germany to initiate a societal revolution in order to prevent these countries from becoming hostile-fascist states again.<sup>5</sup> This led to the establishment of a formal education systems, the School for Military Government, that taught officers to transform societies through a slow process of changing the values and attitudes of the populations and not imposing it upon them with military force.

This success led to a shift in Army culture that called for an officer corps that was more politically savvy and "worldly" beginning in the late 1950s. Even under the growing threat of the Cold War, the United States was becoming more proactive in seeking missions that would support the spread of democracy worldwide and thus counter the Soviet threat. Unfortunately, the specter of Vietnam was on the horizon. The advisory effort there to support the government of South Vietnam devolved into the long-

term full-scale deployment of US forces.

A case study of Vietnam is outside the scope of this paper. However, two inescapable shifts in military culture occurred as a result. First, the long-term commitment of advisory forces was seen as a failure, a pariah, and a drain on much needed Army resources. At its height the advisory effort saw over 24,000 embedded military advisors actively engaged in training South Vietnamese forces without much measurable success. In contrast, the full-scale deployment of the US military resulted in tactical battlefield victories but failed to win a strategic victory. As a result, the institutional Army frowned on the use of advisory forces and began a focus on conventional operations. The second notable outcome of the war was the development and maturing of the US Special Operations Forces (SOF) as a specialized branch of service. While US SOF did conduct advisory missions, it increasingly became a specialized combat and combat intelligence force. However, this did not stop the Army from assuming away the problem of advisory efforts since the US SOF was eager to accept it as a mission set. Thus, the Army began to divest itself of the conventional force capability able to participate in such support operations.

The early 1970s reveal an Army that was seeking to redefine its culture as it began a conscious process of focusing on conventional large-scale warfare. The stinging strategic defeat in Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, and the rising Soviet threat were all factors that lead to this shift.<sup>6</sup> Concurrently, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was established under the leadership of GEN William DePuy to reorganize the post-Vietnam force. DePuy's vision of developing doctrine held that the Army was a machine of multi-functioning parts and that each of these parts had concise

instruction manuals enabling it to function as a whole.<sup>7</sup> Thus, the development of doctrine became prescriptive in nature. DePuy also held the personal view that officer development should focus exclusively on the preparation for command and that additional intellectual skills were a supplement, not a necessity.<sup>8</sup>

With training as the primary learning focus and prescriptive doctrinal models, the Army began the transformation that yielded the successful conventional forces of the late 20<sup>th</sup> century. However, the previously hard-learned lessons about non-conventional conflict and post-conflict occupation were largely forgotten or ignored. A detailed examination of why this occurred is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the Army was then struggling to relearn conventional warfare after a decade of non-conventional war. This amalgamation of “relearning war,” DePuy’s emphasis on systems training, and a conscience move away from policing operations by the Department of Defense resulted in an educational system that placed less and less emphasis on anything other than conventional warfare.<sup>9</sup> Thus, the soldier-statesmen of General Marshall’s generation were slowly replaced with the soldier-warriors of General Schwarzkopf’s generation. Both highly capable, but both were fought to win in vastly different ways.

Renewed emphasis on peacekeeping and stability operations increased during the 1990s. High profile missions to locations such as Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Somalia returned to the vernacular terms such as stability, support, peace-enforcement and peacekeeping to the Army. These missions demonstrated (once again) that the military was an instrument of national power capable of “nation building” when it suited the national interests. The 1993 battle in Mogadishu also showed how quickly a low-intensity mission could become a violent high-intensity conflict. More

importantly, these missions showed the increasing reliance on small unit leaders to execute missions in a complex, dynamically changing environment. DePuy's static post-Vietnam doctrinal model began shifting to the dynamic full spectrum operations model of today.

As the Army was relearning to cope with these new missions, a growing reliance on decentralized execution was also experienced. Low-level leaders, such as company commanders and platoon leaders, were increasingly located as the primary decision maker in rapidly evolving missions. The USMC coined the term "Three Block War" to describe a challenging and dynamically complex geographical area where young leaders can be faced with a multitude of tactical challenges. Former Marine Commandant General Charles Krulak coined the term "Strategic Corporal" in 1999 to illustrate the leadership characteristics required of leaders engaged in the "Three Block War."

Krulak described the strategic corporal as someone who is "the most conspicuous symbol of American foreign policy and will potentially influence not only the immediate tactical situation, but the operational and strategic levels as well."<sup>10</sup> Desirable characteristics of the strategic corporal include: maturity, judgment, strength of character, handles extreme stress, independent, media aware, courageous, aggressive, resolute, integrity, initiative, decisiveness, mental agility, and personal accountability. Krulak also argues that the Marine Corps has a mandate to prepare its junior leaders to fill this role by educating the marines "how to think" rather than "how to act."

### Contemporary Thought

Since 2003, operations in the Global War on Terror are increasing the reliance on the success of the strategic corporal on the battlefield. "Such leaders have repeatedly

been the essential ingredients of the achievement in Iraq.”<sup>11</sup> Dr. Leonard Wong of the Army War College conducted a landmark research paper and study of the impact of Operation Iraqi Freedom on the development of junior leaders. He has identified the operations there as crucible experience for junior officers where they are provided daily opportunities to be creative, innovative, and confident. In short, the cohorts of junior officers in Iraq are becoming pentathlete leaders.

In fact, junior officers themselves are recognizing the shifting paradigm of leadership: “most officers also added that, while they were not becoming better officers in their branch specialty, they were becoming better officers in general.”<sup>12</sup> This is striking and, as Dr. Wong points out, a rare and fleeting opportunity for the Army to capture their lessons learned and apply it to the leader development system.

Recognizing a change in the leadership environment, post 9/11 literature is saturated with calls for adaptable leaders. In 2005, the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences commissioned a research project to examine the feasibility of training adaptability to junior officers. This project determined that there were three types of adaptability expressed when examining leaders in a military environment. These are mental adaptability, interpersonal adaptability, and physical adaptability. These three states express one’s ability to think and solve problems, one’s ability to interact with others, and one’s ability to adjust to environmental stressors.<sup>13</sup> Recognizing that many attributes are a function of personality while others are a function of learning, the researchers identified a continuum of trainable characteristics of adaptability (Table 1).

Table 1. Trainability Continuum for Adaptability Traits <sup>14</sup>			
Less trainable			More trainable
<----->			
Intelligence	Problem Solving	Communication Skills	Domain Knowledge
Openness	Metacognition	Self Awareness	Adaptive Experiences
Resiliency	Self-Efficacy	Situational Awareness	
Tolerance for Ambiguity			
Achievement			
Motivation			

*Source:* Rose A. Mueller-Hanson, et. al., “Training Adaptable Leaders: Lessons from Research and Practice.” (Personnel Decision Research Institutes: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2005). Page 8.

A history review does little to answer the question “does a junior Army leader inherently need these skills in the COE?” An answer to this question, though, is possibly found by looking at the current doctrinal trends of the Army. One such trend is a proof-of-concept program run by TRADOC called the Human Terrain System (HTS). The HTS program is intended to improve the effectiveness of COIN operations by improving the social-cultural knowledge and capabilities of combat units. The HTS has three components: Human Terrain Teams (HTT), Research Reachback Cells (RRC), and a Subject Matter Expert Network (SMEnet). Each HTT is comprised of social scientists, military personnel, and cultural analysts embedded as part of a military staff enabling the processing of socio-cultural knowledge in the military decision making process.

In a July 2007 assessment of the program in Afghanistan several positive impacts of HTS stand out:



Table 2. Human Terrain System Impacts
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A Brigade Combat Team experienced a 60-70% decrease in lethal-offensive operations.</li> <li>• MDMP course of action analysis became increasingly focused on outreach to cultural influencers vice offensive COIN operations.</li> <li>• Improved Situational Awareness and Understanding throughout the BCT.</li> <li>• Improved Information Operations throughout the province.</li> </ul>

## Doctrine

The 2005 DOD Capstone Concept for Joint Operations establishes a framework (derived from various DOD strategy, DOD guidance, National Strategy, and Congressional White Papers) outlining the implications of developing future joint forces for the period of 2012-2025. Education is identified as an affected area in the force generation model in producing leaders with specific traits:

...requires *knowledgeable, empowered, innovative, and decisive leaders*, capable of leading the networked joint force to success in fluid and perhaps chaotic operating environments. *Future* joint leaders will require more comprehensive knowledge of interagency and foreign cultures and capabilities.<sup>15</sup> [emphasis added]

While this list of attributes is clearly meant for a strategic leader, the context of the Capstone Concept is of the future operating environment and future leaders. Therefore, these are leadership traits that the current force should be integrating into its leadership development programs. The attributes mentioned are related to the pentathlete leadership model of Secretary Harvey and GEN Schoomaker.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction number 1800.01C speaks extensively regarding the development of officers from the pre-commissioning to the

General Officer level. It formally outlines the Joint Professional Military Education program (JPME) to certify officer to operate in Joint environments. The CJCSI also places responsibility on individual officers to conduct self-development beyond the formal training programs it outlines.

Cadet and Lieutenant education consists of the first two levels of the JPME to provide a “basic grounding in the US defense establishment and their chosen Military Service.”<sup>16</sup> The CJCSI calls for a training emphasis in commissioning programs to develop an understanding of National Military Capabilities and Organization, Foundations of Joint Warfare, Joint Warfare Fundamentals, and Joint Campaigning. Additionally, the CJCSI mandates that the service chiefs officially report these joint educational programs on a triennial basis.<sup>17</sup>

Joint doctrine also recognizes the affect that junior leaders have in contemporary operations. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, clearly states:

First, having an understanding of the political objective helps avoid actions that may have adverse effects. It is not uncommon in some operations, such as PKO [peace keeping operations], *for junior leaders to make decisions that have significant political implications.*<sup>18</sup> [emphasis added]

The purpose of joint doctrine is to provide a framework for senior leaders to conduct operations and train their subordinates. The statement above is striking because it places a great deal of strategic importance on junior leaders in doctrine written for senior leaders.

Only two published Army manuals directly use the term pentathlete: FM 6-22, *Army Leadership*, published in October 2006 and AR 600-100, *Army Leadership*, published in March 2007. FM 6-22 uses the term pentathlete synonymously with “multi-skilled leader” to refer to leaders who are adept at a multitude of leadership skills

amongst the three core leadership competencies of leading, developing, and achieving. The manual uses only three paragraphs to highlight the importance of developing multi-skilled leaders that can adapt, that comprehend the strategic environment, who are proficient warfighters, who are creative, who possess diplomatic skills, and who are culturally sensitive. It is left to the individual, however, to develop an “attitude [that] will allow growth into new responsibilities and adapt to inevitable changes.”<sup>19</sup>

Chapter 12, of FM 6-22, links the described pentathlete attributes with the desired attributes of strategic leaders with no mention about the development process. Within the confines of FM 6-22 strategic leaders are “general and some senior field grade officers as well as senior Army civilians”<sup>20</sup> that have the leadership scope of influencing thousands of Soldiers and civilians. This seems contradictory to the emergence of the doctrinal shift calling upon junior leaders to have qualities of the strategic corporal and requirements for life-long learning to develop the future senior leaders.

AR 600-100, *Army Leadership*, defines pentathlete with a focus on an over-arching leadership ideal:

*Pentathlete* leaders are innovative, adaptive, and situationally aware professionals who demonstrate character in everything that they do, are experts in the profession of arms, boldly confront uncertainty, and solve complex problems. They are decisive and prudent risk takers who effectively manage, lead, and change organizations. *Pentathletes* are professionally educated, and dedicated to lifelong learning; resilient, mentally and physically agile, empathetic, and self-aware; and confidently lead Soldiers and civilians, build teams, and *achieve the Army’s over-arching strategic goals*, while engendering loyalty and trust.<sup>21</sup>  
[emphasis added]

This definition is not incorporated into the remainder of the regulation to facilitate an understanding between the development of pentathlete leaders for the Army and leadership in general. For example, there is no crosswalk between the attributes listed

above and the eight core leader attributes nor any discussion about the responsibilities of pentathlete development within the Army leader development process.

FM 6-22 and AR 600-100 produce a list of 95 leader attributes encompassing the core leader competencies and the pentathlete subset. Many of these attributes are redundant or repetitive in nature; however there are 14 attributes defined in AR 600-100 that have no direct correlation to the core leader competencies. These are adaptability, boldness, competent decision making, confronts uncertainty, creative thinker, decisiveness, innovative, leads civilians, leads Soldiers, prudent risk taker, resilient, situationally aware, skilled in governance/statesmanship/diplomacy, solves complex problems, and is a strategic thinker. A comparison of the two sets of attributes is contained in Appendix A

FM 7-0, *Training the Force*, is the Army's capstone training document for individuals and units below the division level. Last updated in 2002, it does not use the terms pentathlete or multi-skilled leader. Instead, FM 7-0 uses the term "adaptable leader" to describe leaders with technical and tactical competence, confidence, boldness, and initiative and are able to execute missions in a dynamic environment.<sup>22</sup> The manual does not provide any guidance on the development of an adaptable leader; rather it intimates that becoming an adaptable leader is a function of experience. Institutional training, operational training, major exercises, repetitive training, and command influence are identified as the training enablers for this skill set.

I would caution you always to remember that an essential qualification of a good leader is the ability to recognize, select, and train junior leaders.

GEN Omar Bradley

### Education of Junior Officers

#### General

In the last 55 years, commensurate with the conclusion of WWII, the US Army has conducted 13 major officer education studies. Before 1949, branch sponsored advanced training and education for officers was not systematic. The Army recognized a need to provide a universal understanding of basic competencies in small-unit combat, platoon leader aptitude and basic officership skills to all officers serving in the Regular Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard. Beginning with the Gerow board in 1948, led by Lieutenant General Leonard Gerow, the Army has systematically examined and updated policies and systems to maximize officer education in the institutional Army on a regular basis. The last such board, the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP), met from June 2000 to February 2001.<sup>23</sup>

An analysis of the 13 studies by LTC Kelly Jordan shows five key trends in the institutional development of junior officers. First, since the inclusion of Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) officers in the post-commissioning educational process, there has been an increasing emphasis on task training and the application of professional skills rather than on education and the synthesis of professional skills. Second, after Operation Desert Storm in 1991, there is an increasing inter-relational dependence on the resources of the three levels of education for lieutenants, captains, and majors in the Army. Third, the Army's emphasis on staff skills fluctuates based on the resources and time available during the second level of education provided for captains. Fourth, the

availability of resources directly affects the availability and duration of institutional training and education. And lastly, the findings and recommendations of the ATLDP contrast with the majority of conclusions from the previous 12 studies which emphasized increasing the amount of officer education vice increasing the amount of training.<sup>24</sup>

### Officer Foundation Standards System

A significant change to officer education occurred in 1994 with the publication of DA Pamphlet 350-58, Leader Development for America's Army. PAM 350-58 established a revised self-development program entitled the Officer Foundation Standards System (OFS). OFS replaced the Military Qualification Standards (MQS) with the intention to provide all officers with a sequential training and lifelong learning process facilitated by the institutional pillar of leader development:

OFS provides the skills, knowledge, and behavior officers must master from *precommissioning through promotion to captain* and guidance for continued self-development after promotion to major. Together, DA PAM 600-3 and the OFS System outline the necessary components for *successful officer leader development in all three pillars*.<sup>25</sup> [emphasis added]

“OFS is linked to leader development through the efforts of school commandants.”<sup>26</sup> It specifically cites service schools as OFS levels of accomplishment (OBC, CAS3, etc.) and firmly gives school commandants the mission to enable life-long learning and self-development in each individual as part of the school curriculum. While attending the next level Army school, in theory, the individual develops the next requisite self-development needs. Furthermore, commanders at the organizational level are charged with adding METL based tasks to prepare leaders and further facilitate self-development. There is no mention as to the sourcing for guidance of self-development topics, tasks, or methods.

MQS was divided into two distinct levels MQS I and MQS II. Pre-commissioning sources utilized MQS I as a common task training guide to prepare cadets for their initial assignments and role as leaders. MQS II combined task-based training with topical systems style education that focused company grade officers to prepare them for wartime missions within their service branch while providing a foundation for professional development. To be useful, the MQS utilized published books that the officer could refer to and determine self-development or subordinate-development training.

Under OFS this tiered approach was included as developmental milestones of officers at each grade from lieutenant to major. And, as shown in Table 2 of PAM 350-58 (Appendix C), the accomplishment of the OFS tiers rested solely with the officer as a self-development tool. Unfortunately, unlike MQS, little was produced to facilitate self-development.

There currently exist only 12 published OFS documents,<sup>27</sup> referred to as a Soldier Training Publications (STP). These 12 documents only cover a few of the warfighting functions: Signal Corps, Adjutant General, Finance, Armor, Civil Affairs, Brigade Staff Officers, Brigade Executive Officers, and Psychological Operations. Unlike the older MQS system, the current OFS focuses entirely on service branch skills. Incredibly, of the 12 publications available, only one speaks to the development of junior lieutenants (STP 12-42B-OFS, Adjutant General) and none speak to officership. A cursory review of any STP document shows that the STPs are a task-performance checklist that serves as a training model. As argued in Chapters 1 and 2, training alone does not produce the

pentathlete leader needed in today's operating environment and the STPs provide poor self-development focus.

Clearly, a void was created with the implementation of OFS. The OFS has devolved into a little used system that does not focus on junior officers. By removing the MQS system the Army inadvertently removed a key component of the existing self-development process available to junior officer and junior leader mentors. Further examination of the OFS is beyond the scope of this paper; however, further research focusing in this area may prove useful to determine future modifications to officer development processes.

### Basic Officer Leadership Course

Since 2005, newly commissioned lieutenants prepare for their initial assignment by completing a three-phase program of development and training. Collectively called the Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC), the three phases replace the previous two-phase approach of pre-commissioning and Officer Basic Course. Phase 1 is the pre-commissioning phase and is either 14 weeks or between 24-48 months long that culminates with a commission as a Second Lieutenant. After commissioning, each lieutenant then receives a 6-week common core instruction (Phase 2) to reinforce leadership, confidence, and soldiering skills in a field environment. The final phase (Phase 3) is focused on branch specific training that varies in length depending on the officer's branch of service. Figure 9, below, represents the BOLC model used by the Army:






Figure 9. BOLC Model

Source: COL Anthony Puckett, Basic Officer Leader Course II Information Briefing (Fort Sill, OK: USAAC, 2006). Slide 5 of 23.

Of note is that TRADOC Regulation 350-10, *Institutional Leader Training and Education*, was last updated in 2002. This regulation outlines the policies for conducting institutionally based leadership development. TRADOC developed the BOLC model in 2003 with the intent of shifting development from service-centric officers to Army-centric leaders.<sup>28</sup> BOLC implementation began in 2005 and there has been no update to the base TRADOC policy regulations to reflect this shift.

### BOLC Phase 1 – pre-commissioning

There are three pre-commissioning programs that develop cadets into officers: the United States Military Academy (USMA), Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and Officer Candidate School (OCS). OCS is a focused 14-week training program that commissions highly qualified enlisted Soldiers into officers. Both the USMA and ROTC programs focus on the academic development of undergraduate students in a university

setting. Major differences between USMA and ROTC exist but ROTC commissions the largest number of officers into the Army during any given year. In 2005, ROTC produced 2,641 officers; OCS produced 1,011; and the USMA produced 911.<sup>29</sup>

A requirement for completion of BOLC-1 and commissioning is the possession of an undergraduate degree. USMA and ROTC provide vehicles that provide or aides in the accomplishment of obtaining a degree but it remains an individual responsibility for OCS candidates. Graduates of USMA receive a Bachelor of Science degree with an area of emphasis of the 13 academic departments represented there.<sup>30</sup> Degree programs available to ROTC cadets and OCS candidates are not nearly as restrictive and are limited only to the degrees available through civilian education programs.

There is no formal approval process to approve degrees that an individual pursues; although, ROTC does possess some leverage with scholarship incentives. Currently, ROTC does not explicitly limit the selection of academic disciplines that a scholarship student may pursue; however, specific academic disciplines receive preferential review in the scholarship awarding process. Although there are 373 approved scholarship disciplines, only those that are engineering, physical science, technical management, and nursing focused are identified as the targeted scholarship disciplines.<sup>31</sup> This preferred discipline focus counters the notional need for future Army leaders to possess an education in social sciences, language, and history.

#### United States Military Academy

The USMA was established by Congress in 1802 and is currently authorized under Title 10, section 403, of the United States Code. Its mission is:

To educate, train, and inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate is a commissioned leader of character committed to the values Duty, Honor, Country and prepared for career of professional excellence and service to the Nation as an officer in the United States Army.<sup>32</sup>

The size of the Corps of Cadets is limited to 4,400 and, in addition to receiving an undergraduate bachelor's degree, each cadet receives a Regular Army commission upon graduation.

USMA Circular 1-101, *Cadet Leader Development System* (CLDS), is the academy's guiding document for leadership development and provides a shared vision for implementation. CLDS integrates the academic, military and physical development of cadets during the four-year development cycle. Like other training and education doctrine, the CLDS system is based on the BE-KNOW-DO domain model introduced in the superceded FM 22-100 (It is not known if the April 2006 revisionists of USMA 1-101 knew of the pending doctrinal changes that FM 6-22 presented in October 2006). USMA 1-101 firmly establishes the BE-KNOW-DO domains as the construct of cadet leadership development and assessment.

The CLDS also incorporates an emphasized educational goal to develop a strong sense of officership in the cadets. Based in the USMA Strategic Vision-2010 and the USMA mission statement, officership is defined as a strategic level goal:

...prepared for the uncertainty and ambiguity of military service...because they will have reflected upon and developed a personal understanding of the unique characteristics of their chosen profession and the principles that govern the fulfillment of their office.<sup>33</sup>

As defined by the authors of 1-101, officership is a combination the interrelated attributes of warrior, servant of the nation, member of a profession, and leader of character.<sup>34</sup>

Additionally eight principles are defined to serve as career-long self-development guides:

duty, honor, loyalty, service to country, competence, teamwork, subordination, and leadership. USMA Circular 1-101 makes it very clear that officership is the cornerstone of the BE domain knowledge that the cadet's development and future growth is founded upon.

Using BE-KNOW-DO, the USMA Cir 1-101 further defines specific skills and attributes a graduating cadet should have in order to BE a commission officer:

Understands (KNOW):

- The tactical basics of the profession of arms and the application of a broad liberal education in the arts and sciences to that profession;
- The ideals of the American Constitution and the responsibilities of commissioned officers to its defense;
- The values and ethical standards of the United States Army – *The Professional Military Ethic*.

Demonstrates (DO):

- Personal devotion to the duties of a commissioned officer;
- Intellectual curiosity, imagination, and creativity;
- Ability to act rationally and decisively under pressure;
- Mastery of the basic military and physical skills required for entry into commissioned service;
- Adherence to standards – academic, physical, military, and ethical;
- Inspiration and motivation to lead American Soldiers in war and peace – leadership characterized by a *winning spirit*;
- Ability and motivation to achieve and sustain unit climates that are conducive to military effectiveness and professional excellence;
- Personal commitment to the selfless standards of officership within the United States Army.<sup>35</sup>

The program of development is an immersive experience commonly referred to as the “West Point Experience.” Cadets are immersed in a series of activities for approximately 47 months, 24 hours a day, and 7 days a week to develop their military aptitude, academic education, and physical development. Figure 10, below, illustrates the 47 months cycle of cadet development. Basically, each academic year provides cadets with opportunities of mentored leadership development that grow more complex and

independent with each academic year. Between academic years, cadets have additional developmental opportunities through Military Training events such as Cadet Troop Leader Training, Drill Cadet Leader Training, and Military Development Schools.




Figure 10. The 4-year USMA Cadet Development Program

Source: USMA Circular 1-101 (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 2006). Page 38.

Feedback regarding military development is continuously provided to cadets through the Cadet Performance Report, which is similar in nature to the Army Officer Evaluation Report (DA FORM 67-9-1). The report serves as the foundation for an academic grade in military development and as a self-assessment instrument for future growth and focus. Cadets are no longer ranked using the traditional General Order of Merit list; instead, cadets received a Cadet Performance Ranking that is based on their performance in the three development domains. A cadet's ranking is determined with the weighted average of performance of 55% academic grade, 30% military development grade, and 15% physical development grade.<sup>36</sup> The Cadet Performance Ranking is then

used as a metric to determine the order in which cadets may choose their branch and initial assignments.

#### Reserve Officers Training Corps

The regulatory mission of the ROTC program is “to produce commissioned officers in the quality, quantity, and academic disciplines necessary to meet Active Army and Reserve Component requirements.”<sup>37</sup> However, this mission requirement is internally modified and restated as “to commission the future officer leadership of the US Army and motivate young people to be better citizens.”<sup>38</sup> This differs greatly from the USMA mission statement and does not speak to the education or character development of the cadets. ROTC is operated by Cadet Command, an organization that is subordinate to the US Army Accessions Command (USAAC) organized in 2002 as a major subordinate command of TRADOC. USAAC’s mission focus is on the recruitment and initial training of Soldiers and officers into the Army. Other subordinate organizations include the US Army Recruiting Command, the US Army Training Center, Officer Candidate School, Warrant Officer Career Center, and the Drill Instructor School. USAAC provides the command and control structure for the recruiting and initial training of all Army officers, warrant officers, and enlisted Soldiers. It should be noted that USMA is a direct reporting unit to the Department of the Army and is not subordinate to USAAC.<sup>39</sup>

The origins of ROTC began with the Morrill Act of 1862 establishing land-grant universities in the United States to teach agriculture, mechanics, arts, and military tactics. Over time this requirement to instruct military tactics evolved into the three ROTC programs known today and authorized under Title 10, Subtitle A, Chapter 103 of the

United States Code. First, there are six Senior Military College<sup>40</sup> ROTC programs that organize the student bodies into corps of cadets and instill a military culture and discipline similar to the one found at USMA. Cadets graduating this program are guaranteed an active duty commission, if requested, under Title 10. The second program is run at civilian colleges that grant baccalaureate or graduate degrees where ROTC Military Science is offered as a course program. And the third program is the Military Junior College that provides high school and junior college education but does not grant undergraduate degrees. All three types of schools provide reserve or regular Army commissions to qualified and accepted candidates in a 24-48 month program.<sup>41</sup>

ROTC cadets complete a capstone-training event between their junior and senior year of college known as the Leader Development and Assessment Course (LDAC), or Warrior Forge Training (WF). This 33-day long immersive event training exposes cadets to intentionally stressful small-unit-tactics to build confidence and a sense of team accomplishment. WF is also used as the primary vehicle to evaluate officer potential before commissioning. This evaluation, recorded on Cadet Command Form 67-9 (Cadet Evaluation Report), is used in the accession process as tool to determine the cadet's Order of Merit ranking.

Similar to USMA's Cadet Performance Ranking, the Order of Merit Score (OMS) ranking is a major factor in determining the cadet's branch of service. A cadet's OMS rank is based on 40% academic grades (all university studies), 45% military assessment grade, and 15% physical development grade.<sup>42</sup> A national Order of Merit List (OML) is compiled during the cadet's senior year of school. Other factors in determining the branch of service include branch yearly accession requirements,

academic degree, personal preference, prior military service, and a recommendation of the Professor of Military Science.<sup>43</sup> The top 10% of cadets selected for active duty on the OML list are given first choice of branch assignment, and the remaining 90% are selected through a branching board process. In the FY06 boarding process, 64% of cadets received their first branch of choice.<sup>44</sup>

While similar to the USMA formula, the ROTC OML differs dramatically in the academic grade evaluation. Universities, and even academic departments within each university, do not apply a universal grading standard or credit load requirement. For example, an engineering student at an “Ivy League” university with 162 credit hours might have a lower cumulative GPA than a criminal justice student at a state-sponsored university with 90 hours. There is no mechanism in place to account for this and the OML becomes un-naturally biased and discriminates against students seeking degrees in difficult disciplines. In an ironic twist, scholarship recipients in the currently targeted “hard science” disciplines are faced with a potential disadvantage in the OML calculation! The military assessment grade, therefore, is weighted more heavily than USMA and WF is recognized as the “single most important event thus far in the career of a cadet or officer candidate”<sup>45</sup> due in no small part to the affect it has on the final outcome of a cadet’s OML ranking.

The primary focus of WF is small-unit-tactics at the squad and platoon level culminating in a 10-day scenario driven field exercise called STX lanes. Cadets conduct tactical patrols and execute two 6-8 hour missions per day. Cadets then rotate through the leadership positions and are evaluated on their abilities to apply small unit operations concepts, leadership, mission focus, and teamwork. Two of these 10 days replicate



dynamic environments as found in the COE through events such as dealing with the media or reacting to refugees. Platoon level events may incorporate these non-conventional variables but mostly focus on conventional missions. During this time, each cadet has three leadership opportunities and three evaluations.

Each mission is different and therefore every cadet's experience differs. With such an emphasis on the tactical missions, it is easily concluded that not every cadet will receive the educational benefit of encountering a non-conventional situation. It then becomes questionable if this process adequately assesses the leadership potential of individuals in the non-conventional environment. An evaluation process that inadvertently rewards tactical audacity over adaptability may overlook a cadet with tremendous leadership potential in a non-conventional environment.

Like USMA, ROTC cadets have the opportunity to attend additional training under the Cadet Practical Field Training program (CPFT) and Cadet Troop Leadership Training (CTLT) program. Opportunities for CPFT are limited in availability and generally limited to the summer between the sophomore and junior years (the following summer cadets attend WF). CPFT includes training opportunities such as Airborne, Air Assault, Combat Survival, Combat Diver Qualification, Mountain Warfare Training, and Northern Warfare Training.<sup>46</sup> At the completion of WF, cadets may participate in the CTLT program and apply leadership skills as an Army platoon leader, Army drill cadet, or technical program intern. The program is an incentive and reward system; however, it provides selected cadets a valuable first exposure experience of their future in the Army.

The 1999 ROTC Future Lieutenant Study recommended that the ROTC Advanced Camp (WF) reduce its focus on evaluation and increase focus on training.

Cadets know WF to be the capstone event of the skills that they are expected to fully master and hence their ROTC education becomes focused on preparing for this single event.<sup>47</sup> Precious time in developing the higher-level thinking and leadership competencies is lost in favor of preparation of STX lane patrolling skills. In this same study, the senior consulting leadership involved also called for a balancing of the ROTC curricula to be more inclusive of cultural awareness, sociology, athletics, interpersonal skills, and communications.

The author also noted during the research that the ROTC leadership development focus lags both USMA and the active Army significantly. This is likely due to the large size, complexity, and geographic dispersion of the ROTC institutions in the United States. However, ROTC produces the most lieutenants entering active duty and they begin the Operational Assignments domain learning process almost immediately. Considering the diverse environments of an academic institution versus an initial assignment, it is of concern that ROTC still uses the supplanted FM 22-100 as the primary learning vehicle for leader development. Lieutenants not taught current doctrine are therefore left at a disadvantage when working with Soldiers for the first time. As noted in a January 2007 curriculum review board, there is concern that any change in the curriculum to meet the competency-based model of FM 6-22 might interfere with the existing training curriculum to achieve BOLC training task objectives.<sup>48</sup> The earliest implementation of FM 6-22 based education may occur in the spring of 2008 nearly 2 years after FM 6-22 was available.

## BOLC Phase 2 – Common Experience

After commissioning and upon entry to active duty, newly minted lieutenants must attend Phase-2 training. This 6-week training program at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, or Fort Benning, Georgia, is mandatory regardless of branch of service and is the first time students from USMA, ROTC, and OCS participate in the same training program. It provides a core-training program that reinforces Warrior Tasks that are common across the Army's operational spectrum. Warrior Tasks are tasks that an average platoon leader could expect to encounter during an initial combat assignment.

There are 58 mandated training tasks in BOLC-2. As a management tool, these tasks are subdivided into tiers to identify the priority of training effort. Tier 1 being the most critical and Tier 4 being "as time permits." Additionally, a division for the type of training for each task is applied. Training could be programmed, integrated w/other training, awareness training, or refresher training. Table 3, below, shows how the 58 tasks are programmed for implementation as of March 2007. Many of the training tasks are redundant from the training received from BOLC-1. Of the 58 BOLC-2 tasks only 10 of these are newly introduced material.

Table 3. BOLC Phase 2 prioritization of training tasks, March 2007 <sup>49</sup>					
TIER	P Prescribed	I Integrated	A Awareness	R Refresher	Total
I: Critical	10	37	4		51
II: Important		2	2	1	5
III: Time Available		2			2
Total	10	41	6	1	58

A 2006 assessment study of BOLC-2 (conducted by the United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences) concluded that although the majority of lieutenants felt that BOLC-2 showed redundancy with the BOLC-1 pre-commissioning training.<sup>50</sup> Additionally, lieutenants felt that the total time spent on COE related training events was inadequate and needed expansion. As a result, many lieutenants “felt they learned very little during BOLC-2 and indicated that BOLC-2 was worse/much worse than what they had expected.”<sup>51</sup> A staggering 83% of lieutenants studied reported that BOLC-2 did little to prepare them to be platoon leaders and 51% felt that BOLC-2 did little to make them better leaders in general.<sup>52</sup>

Each lieutenant receives a leadership assessment from the BOLC-2 cadre. Included in this is an assessment on four dimensions of individual adaptability: mental, interpersonal, leading an adaptable unit, and physical. Nearly all lieutenant in the 2005 study received satisfactory or excellent ratings, which would seem to indicate that adaptability is an embedded leadership dimension. However, the study members noted

that there is very limited instruction that focuses on improving adaptability traits during the BOLC-2 course. The study members concluded that the ratings do not provide an accurate representation of how lieutenants would react during a real-world situation requiring adaptable skills. Furthermore, “specific training events must be integrated into the BOLC-2 program of instruction that challenge the lieutenants’ decision-making and adaptive thinking skills.”<sup>53</sup>

The 2006 study was conducted shortly after the implementation of the BOLC program began. As noted by the researchers, the high operational-tempo of the six-week course and relative “newness” of the instructors and material may have skewed the data. However, the results reflect the complexity of introducing an ill-defined training objective, adaptability, to an increasingly sophisticated and intelligent audience. Eager lieutenants are simply not receiving a quality educational learning experience that matches their pre-existing skill sets, learning abilities, and expectations. The study’s survey results also reflect the dissatisfaction many lieutenants held with BOLC-2. In all fairness, a newer study should be completed to analyze the progress of any refinements to the POI for BOLC-2.

### BOLC Phase 3 – Branch Training

The final phase of BOLC, Phase 3, is branch specific training that prepares the lieutenant to perform the technical specifics of their duty branch for their initial assignment in the Army. These courses are taught by TRADOC at a service school or training school. BOLC-3 can last from six to 14 weeks depending on the service branch requirements.

## Functional Training

Functional Training is focused technical or tactical skill developmental training that Soldiers and officers have the opportunity to attend. For example, it would not be uncommon for an Infantry Officer to attend the 9-week long US Army Ranger School soon after completion of BOLC-3. Successful completion of the school equates to an official vetting or certification that the student has mentally and physically proven his worth as an Infantryman under extraordinarily tough conditions. For officers, completion also endows an aura of a highly competent tactical leader. The Ranger Tab decoration worn by graduates of the school also reflects a deep cultural and historical heritage within the US Army.

Many other Functional Training courses exist within the Army. The Airborne School, Air-Assault School, Ranger School, and Mountain Warfare School are known as leader producing curriculums. They all exhibit high levels of artificially induced stress, little sleep, and demanding training to push the mental and physical limits of the soldier. This produces Soldiers that are adaptable and agile in the face of uncertainty. However, not all functional training has this effect. Selected USMA and ROTC cadets have the ability to attend limited functional training opportunities while in a cadet status.<sup>54</sup>

Specialized branches have specialized functional training to develop branch specific skills. For example, the Field Artillery's AFATDS Command and Staff Course most likely does not produce agile leaders of the same caliber as the Infantry Corps' Ranger School. While the developmental results of programs such as Ranger School are highly desirable, the opportunities to attend are limited to only combat arms officers. In the case of Ranger training only Infantry and Armor Soldiers may attend. The reader

must recognize that resource limitations will prescribe the quantity and branch specialty of Solders that may attend. However, it seems inconceivable in the era of modularity and combined arms that not all officers have an equal opportunity for this effective leadership development process.

### Captain's Career Course

Once selected for promotion to Captain, officers attend a branch orientated Captain's Career Course (CCC). It combines branch specific education formally known as the Officer Advanced Course with the staff orientation training formerly provided by the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3). Its primary focus is to prepare the officers for company command and staff competencies.<sup>55</sup> Each branch of service determines qualification for attendance and the course curriculum. Other than the CAS3 directed curriculum there is little uniformity amongst the branches. There is no mandate in DA PAM 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, for inclusion of combined arms or multi-functional training. The CCC is the last formal education experience that an officer receives until they are promoted to the grade of Major.

Officers can never act with confidence until they are masters of their profession.

Henry Knox

### Leader Education in Industry

Management and leadership are not synonymous. Management involves the influencing of people and processes due primarily to position. Management is process

based relying on supervisory skills to maintain a control of resources or employees. On the other hand, leadership gains its power through the ability to influence others to reach an intended goal with little direct supervision. Indeed, a leader does not necessarily need to hold a position over an employee to obtain results. Warren Bennis, a pioneering scholar of organizational and leadership studies, derived a set of 12 basic differences between leaders and managers:

Table 4. Managers vs. Leaders <sup>56</sup>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Managers administer, leaders innovate</li> <li>• Managers ask how and when, leaders ask what and why</li> <li>• Managers focus on systems, leaders focus on people</li> <li>• Managers do things right, leaders do the right things</li> <li>• Managers maintain, leaders develop</li> <li>• Managers rely on control, leaders inspire trust</li> <li>• Managers have a short-term perspective, leaders have a longer-term perspective</li> <li>• Managers accept the status-quo, leaders challenge the status-quo</li> <li>• Managers have an eye on the bottom line, leaders have an eye on the horizon</li> <li>• Managers imitate, leaders originate</li> <li>• Managers emulate the classic good soldier, leaders are their own person</li> <li>• Managers copy, leaders show originality</li> </ul>

Executive development is considered a core competency among many corporations in the US. The development process varies greatly; however, the processes all share a commonality of identification of young leaders with great potential and then spending years of focused development to produce the future leaders of the company. This is not unlike the Army's commissioning process described above where young



adults are groomed through the BOLC and functional development education before assignment. Also of note is a commonality to infuse a cultural identity in these leader candidates that deeply root the company's culture, values, and practices. Almost without exception, all development involves mentorship methods where executives will guide the development and growth of these candidates.

Small companies, however, find it particularly challenging to accomplish this mentorship development process. In general, small companies do not possess the resources, time, or experience to establish a mentorship development program. In these cases, companies are forced to look outside of themselves to replace or build-up executive leadership when required. Removing employees for externally provided education or development for any period of time could prove too costly to the company to sustain. As a result, institutional culture and values are affected, as these new leaders have not developed in that environment and the organization adapts to the new leadership. This problem is not unlike the challenges faced by any Army organization that undergoes a change of command.

Innovative solutions do exist. CIK Enterprises<sup>57</sup>, located in Indianapolis, Indiana, is one such company that has successfully implemented an internal development program with little impact on their company's current operations. CIK, with only 80 employees, established a 12-month long university-learning model to train its potential leaders. Over the course of these 12-months a total of four to eight nominated employees conduct small group learning in a non-threatening environment called "the Incubator." The program includes round table discussions about the company's financial and operating data, community service projects (teambuilding), contemporary book readings, individual and

team projects, presentations, and business planning. Both executives and employees say that the program benefits the organization and individual resulting in financial savings and business growth. CIK's attributes the success of the program to the following:

Table 5. "Incubator" mentorship program
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A senior executive of the company mentors the small group.</li> <li>• Supervisors nominate members, who are then selected by a board to participate; volunteers are not permitted.</li> <li>• The projects conducted are relevant, but not a primary focus of current operations.</li> <li>• Each member prepares and conducts group briefings.</li> <li>• Each member develops a business plan.</li> <li>• Teams meet for 2-hours a week.</li> <li>• Entrepreneurship is a focused learning objective (i.e. adaptability)</li> </ul>

Another focus area that consistently appears in corporate development is cultural understanding and awareness. Commonly referred to as Cultural Intelligence (CQ), it is the development of skills at being flexible in understanding a culture, learning about it, and progressively reshaping one's thinking. CQ enables a person to be sympathetic to different cultures and thereby shapes behavior responses to be more skilled and appropriate when immersed in new cultural environments.<sup>58</sup> In other words, CQ is the union of acquired knowledge, behavioral skills, and an adaptive behavior. These three sets show similarity to Benjamin Bloom's Cognitive Taxonomy where knowledge begets application begets a synthesis.

Research also revealed that CQ is a desirable trait in many larger and international companies. However, as first proposed by Christopher Earley and Elaine Mosakowski in

the Harvard Business Review, CQ also relates to the cultures within an organization. Examples of such differences are ones between departments, professions, and geographical areas. It is easy to correlate a need for CQ to the US Army since international contact is commonplace and internal branch and unit rivalries thrive. Earley and Mosakowski propose that CQ is related to three fundamentals: cognitive, physical, and emotional traits. To develop CQ, an individual first assesses their own strengths and weaknesses and then focuses training to improve those weaknesses. Simple exercises can reinforce the development of emotive traits followed by immersion and reassessment.<sup>59</sup>

Also noted in the research is that highly effective leaders of large corporations also possess a trait known as Emotional Intelligence (EQ). Dr. Daniel Goleman, a prominent psychologist and researcher on the topic, describes the five main components of EQ as self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation, empathy, and social skill. His research definitively illustrates that businesses with leaders possessing high degrees of EQ consistently outperform contemporaries whose leaders do not possess effective EQ.<sup>60</sup> The application of EQ in an organization allows it to effectively handle organizational stress, establish organizational level relationships, and lead the organization.

EQ is a means of tempering one's personality with the requirements of effectively guiding the organization. Self-regulation and self-awareness illuminate the effect that mood, emotion, and desire on one's ability to influence others. This should not be confused with a leadership style; rather it is a cognitive process that enables the leader to achieve the desired influence on others and the organization. A linkage then exists between CQ and EQ. To affect people of other cultures, leaders must possess the five EQ traits in order to shape their own behavior in cultural environments as required by CQ.

Goleman's research also indicates that EQ abilities are both a biological trait and a result of the process of maturity in an individual. He asserts that EQ is not a personality trait and that it can be learned through a focused approach that helps individuals overcome learned behaviors through practice, coaching, and honest self-assessment.<sup>61</sup> Empathy, he notes, is not an easily learned trait and requires a concerted effort and desire on the part of the individual.

Leadership theory is a common theme in corporate literature. Stephen Covey, author of *The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People* recognized that leadership development inseparably links the leader with the pupil. "The best way to get people to learn is to turn them into teachers."<sup>62</sup> It empowers the student to learn better for the simple fact that it gives ownership of the teaching subject to the pupil. The act of teaching is also a means of learning. Ownership of the subject socially commits the pupil to excel and master the topic. Covey also speaks about the need for self-assessment in one's personal and professional life. By reflection on behavior, motive, attitudes, direction, and goals an individual will internalize his own values into those of the organizational principles and values.

The trained American possesses qualities that are almost unique. Because of his initiative and resourcefulness, his adaptability to change and his readiness to resort to expedient, he becomes, when he has attained a proficiency in all the normal techniques of battle, a most formidable soldier. Yet even he has his limits; the preservation of his individual and collective strength is one of the greatest responsibilities of leadership.

General Dwight Eisenhower

## Pentathlete Attributes, Skills, and Competencies

As noted by Wong, Gerras, Kidd, Pricone, and Swengros a long list of skills, attributes, knowledge, and attributes is problematic and an untenable mechanism to assess a leader's abilities.<sup>63</sup> It is therefore necessary to categorize the lists determined above into a manageable form for additional analysis. A holistic assessment of the pentathlete leader can be used where interrelated competencies are grouped together in a unified fashion. Such meta-competencies ease the analysis and allow improved discussion. A meta-competency is loosely defined as a critically important competency that enables lifelong learning and success at using a multitude of other skills.<sup>64</sup> Figure 11 below depicts this model:




Figure 11. Leadership Meta-competencies

### Meta-competencies

Army Officers are introduced to meta-competencies in the study of leadership. The common BE-KNOW-DO<sup>65</sup> model of leadership discussed in FM-1, *The Army*,

expresses the fundamentals of leadership. Leadership actions (DO) are developed from who the leader inherently is (BE) and applying their knowledge to influence others (KNOW). The introduction of the revised leadership doctrine, FM 6-22, replaced BE-KNOW-DO competencies with the more inclusive Leads-Develops-Achieves<sup>66</sup> competencies. However, as noted above, these competencies are not inclusive of the emerging requirements for adaptable and multi-skilled leaders. Therefore, the Leads-Develops-Achieves competencies cannot be presumed to be meta-competencies and must be subordinate to a larger meta-competency.

The ATLDP introduced the concept of describing a meta-competency in the discussion of leadership. The panel identified two symbiotic meta-competencies to describe the future needs of leadership for the Objective Force (future Army force structure). These are *self-awareness* and *adaptability*<sup>67</sup>. The ability to identify, understand and correct weaknesses in the environment (*self-awareness*) is linked to the ability to assess and learn methods to overcome that weakness (*adaptability*). The panel did not, however, attempt to determine what subordinate competencies, attributes, and skills are required in order to achieve proficiency in these two meta-competencies.

In 2003, the Strategic Studies Institute conducted a study of the required leadership skill sets in the post-9/11 environment. This study concluded that there are not two but six meta-competencies: *identity, mental agility, cross-cultural savvy, interpersonal maturity, world-class warrior, and professional astuteness* (Appendix B contains a complete definition of each meta-competency). This study focused on strategic leaders (senior Army leaders); however, this comprehensive list of competencies is relevant in not only assessing current leader abilities but also serves as a model for

desired officer leadership attributes. The junior leader of today is the strategic leader of tomorrow. Therefore, it is concluded that, these six meta-competencies are relevant and useful to use in the examination and development of the pentathlete leader as well.

*Self-awareness* and *identity* are similar in nature except that *identity* also encompasses a comprehension of one's role as an officer in the Army and in American society.<sup>68</sup> This is a facet that the ATDLP lacks in defining the meta-competency but as noted from the research above, a facet that Army Doctrine (such as FM 6-22) requires as a leadership attribute. Therefore, *self-awareness* is not an independent meta-competency but a sub-competency to *identity*. In a similar fashion, *adaptability* reveals itself to be a sub-competency to *mental agility*. While ATDLP's definition of *adaptability* focuses on a learning process, the strategic leader's *mental agility* describes a cognitive ability to *identity* and ultimately affects a complex and changing environment.<sup>69</sup>

The strategic leader meta-competencies of *world-class warrior*, *professional astuteness*, and the three core Army leader competencies defined in FM 6-22 (*leads*, *develops*, *achieves*) also have overlapping dependence. The relationship, though, may not be entirely relevant for younger officers as these competencies are dependant on a function of time and experience. It simply is not realistic to assume that a junior officer will have developed the knowledge and skills to fully possess the *world-class warrior* and *professional astuteness* that a more senior officer will inherently possess. For example, development of technical and tactically proficiency requires exposure and experience.<sup>70</sup> As mentioned above, though, these traits are essential for future leadership roles and require progressive development. Therefore, an *Army Leader* meta-competency

is needed that includes subordinate *world-class warrior* and existing core Army leader competencies.

The development of *professional astuteness*, *mental agility*, *inter-personal agility*, and *cross-cultural savvy* as separate meta-competencies require both time and experience in order to achieve a level of cognitive synthesis, as Bloom's Taxonomy seems to indicate. As noted in Chapter 3, any model must take into account the experience levels of the junior officer. Six meta-competencies are too broad in scope to allow any focused approach at junior officer development. Using Wong's research on strategic leader development it can be reasoned that over time a junior officer will develop these competencies to an extent that they become meta-competencies.

*Identity* is inclusive of the concepts of officership, values, self-assessment, and self-development.<sup>71</sup> Thus *Identity* is the second meta-competency that describes the junior pentathlete but it is not an adjective that adequately relays the meaning; therefore the meta-competency of *Aware Leader* is defined. Both *cross-cultural savvy* and *interpersonal maturity* deal with the ability of an officer to understand, incorporate, and influence persons or groups outside of his direct influence as a leader. Both competencies are useful in the application of various leadership styles but are quite distinct in the fact that direct leadership has little bearing on successful influence of external groups. Thus, *Versatile Leader*, is defined as the third and final junior leader meta-competency.

Figure 12 illustrates these competencies and subordinate competencies discussed so far. The discussion that follows below will fuse the attributes, skills, and knowledge uncovered during the research that are subordinate to each of the three meta-



competencies and nine competencies of the pentathlete leader. AR 600-100 and FM 6-22 are the base models from which these lists are derived; however, the major source of noted attributes is listed for reference. The author has taken some liberty to redefine and re-categorize some of the base model attributes to more suitably match the desired leader model. Some attributes relate to more than one competency. Sources are listed and common attributes have been grouped together.



Figure 12. Objective Junior Leader Competencies

### Army Leader

FM 6-22 formally defines Army Leader in the context of leadership. For the purposes of this paper, *Army Leader* is a meta-competency of four leadership competencies and should not be confused with the FM 6-22 definition. The subordinate competencies are the previously established leader competencies of FM 6-22 and include the strategic leader competency of *world-class warrior*. *Army Leaders* serve as a role

model, team builder, warrior, influencer, and achiever. An *Army Leader* is the minimum requirement expected of all Army officers that take the commissioning oath.

1) The *Leads* competency attributes include: <sup>72</sup>

Effective in leading organizations	AR 600-100
Engenders loyalty	AR 600-100
Confident	AR 600-100
Sets standard of character	AR 600-100
Sets standard of integrity	AR 600-100
Empathetic	AR 600-100
Leads civilians	AR 600-100, CCJO
Leads Soldiers	AR 600-100, CCJO
Effective Communicator	AR 600-100, Grant, Keenan
Establishes and imparts clear intent and purpose	FM 6-22
Builds and maintains alliances	FM 6-22
Uses appropriate influence techniques to energize others	FM 6-22
Balances requirements of mission with welfare of followers	FM 6-22
Understands sphere of influence, means of influence and limits of influence	FM 6-22
Understands the importance of conceptual skills and models them to others	FM 6-22
Employs engaging communication techniques	FM 6-22
Builds trust	FM 6-22, AR 600-100
Listen actively	FM 6-22, Grant
Fosters teamwork, cohesion, cooperation, and loyalty	FM 6-22, ROTC
Makes decisions	Grant, ROTC
Dominance (attrib)	ROTC
Decisive	CCJO

2) The *Develops* competency attributes include:

Fosters teamwork, cohesion, cooperation, and loyalty	FM 6-22
Encourages subordinates	FM 6-22
Creates a learning environment	FM 6-22
Encourages open and candid communications	FM 6-22
Encourages fairness and inclusiveness	FM 6-22
Expresses and demonstrates care for people and their well being	FM 6-22
Anticipates peoples on the job needs	FM 6-22
Sets and maintains high expectations	FM 6-22
Accepts reasonable setbacks and failures	FM 6-22

Assess current developmental needs of others	FM 6-22
Fosters job development, job challenge, and job enrichment	FM 6-22
Counsels, coaches, and mentors	FM 6-22
Facilitates ongoing development	FM 6-22
Supports institutional-based development	FM 6-22
Builds team skills and processes	FM 6-22
Builds Leaders	AR 600-100
Rational and decisive under pressure	USMA 1-101

3) The <i>Achieves</i> competency attributes include:	Prioritizes, organizes, and coordinates	FM 6-22
	IDs and accounts for individual and group capabilities	FM 6-22
	Designates, clarifies, and deconflicts	FM 6-22
	Manages resources	FM 6-22
	Removes work barriers	FM 6-22
	Recognizes and rewards good performance	FM 6-22
	Seeks improvement	FM 6-22
	Makes feedback part of the work process	FM 6-22
	Executes plans to accomplish the mission	FM 6-22
	Manages, lead, and change	AR 600-100
	Achieves professionally effective unit climate	USMA 1-101

4) The <i>Warrior</i> competency attributes include:	
Competent full-spectrum warfighter	AR 600-100
Situationally Aware	AR 600-100
Tactically & Technically competent	FM 7-0
Sound Judgment	Krulak
Makes independent decisions	Krulak
Media Awareness	Krulak
Initiative	Krulak, FM 7-0
Leads with confidence	FM 6-22
Courage	Krulak
Integrity	Krulak
Aggressiveness	Krulak
Decisiveness	AR 600-100, CCJO, Krulak
Audacious	Wong
Understands the tactical basics of the profession	USMA 1-101
Winning Spirit leadership	USMA 1-101

## Aware Leader

The *Aware Leader* meta-competency includes *self-aware* and *professionally astute* competencies. The reader must make a distinction that *Aware Leader* is not merely an extension of knowing one's strengths and weaknesses. *Aware Leader* is an understanding of one's values, drive, role, and officership commitment.

1) The <i>Self-Aware</i> competency attributes include:	Empathetic and always positive	AR 600-100
	Lifelong Learner	AR 600-100
	Physically agile	AR 600-100
	Mentally agile	AR 600-100, ARI
	Dedicated to lifelong learning	AR 600-100
	Confident and competent decision maker in uncertain situations	AR 600-100
	Prudent risk taker	AR 600-100
	Self-Aware	AR 600-100, Grant
	Confident	AR 600-100, FM 7-0, Wong
	Bold	AR 600-100, FM 7-0, Wong
	Maintains mental and physical health	FM 6-22
	Maintains self-awareness	FM 6-22
	Evaluates and incorporates feedback from others	FM 6-22
	Expands conceptual and interpersonal capabilities	FM 6-22
	Seeks improvement	FM 6-22
	Self directed	Keenan, FM 7-0
	Anticipates	Keenan
	Strength of Character	Krulak
	Mature	Krulak
	Handles extreme stress	Krulak
	Resolve and Determination	Krulak
	Personal Accountability	Krulak
	Physical hardiness (attrib)	RFLS, ARI
	Emotional Intelligence	Romaine, ROTC
	Selfless Service (value)	ROTC
	Respect (value)	ROTC
	Computer (skill)	ROTC
	Followership (attrib)	ROTC
	Creative	USMA 1-101, Wong
	Intellectually curious	USMA 1-101
	Imaginative	USMA 1-101

- 2) The *Professionally Astute* competency attributes include:  
Maintains and enforces high professional standards FM 6-22

Displays character by modeling the Army Values	FM 6-22
Demonstrates commitment to the Nation, Army, Unit, Soldiers, Community, and multinational partners	FM 6-22
Expert in the Profession of Arms	AR 600-100
Expands knowledge of technical and tactical areas	FM 6-22
Professionally educated	AR 600-100
Skilled in governance, statesmanship and diplomacy	AR 600-100
Strategic Thinker	AR 600-100
Demonstrates Army Values/Ethos	Haynes
Duty	USMA 1-101
Honor	USMA 1-101
Loyalty	USMA 1-101
Service to Country	USMA 1-101
Competence	USMA 1-101
Teamwork	USMA 1-101
Subordination	USMA 1-101
Leadership	USMA 1-101
Values and Ethical Standards of the US Army	USMA 1-101
Ideals of the American Constitution and responsibilities of commissioned officers	USMA 1-101
Devoted to the duties of a commissioned officer	USMA 1-101
Committed to selfless standards of officership	USMA 1-101
Knowledge of National Military capabilities and organization	CJCSI 1800.01C
Foundation of Joint Warfare	CJCSI 1800.01C
Fundamentals of Joint Warfare	CJSCI 1800.01C
Joint Campaigning	CJSCI 1800.01C, CCJO

### Versatile Leader

The *Versatile Leader* meta-competency, unlike the previous two, is inclusive of skills and attributes that allow an officer to shape his environment. It allows the leader to recognize the environment, develop and apply solutions to that environment, and deconflict what the organization needs. While many of the skills listed in these three competencies are arguably traditional leadership skills, they are none-the-less essential in allowing a leader to expand the capabilities of an organization.

- 1) The *Mental Agility* competency attributes include: Confront uncertainty

	AR 600-100
Resilient	AR 600-100
Solve Complex Problems	AR 600-100
Creative Thinker	AR 600-100, Grant
Adaptive	AR 600-100, FM 7-0, Keenan, Wong, ROTC
Innovative	AR 600-100, CCJO, Wong
Analyzes and organizes information to create knowledge	FM 6-22
Maintains relevant cultural awareness	FM 6-22
Maintains relevant geopolitical awareness	FM 6-22
Prioritizes, organizes, and coordinates	FM 6-22
Designates, clarifies, and deconflicts	FM 6-22
Makes feedback part of the work process	FM 6-22
Develops Methods	Grant
Small Business Minded	Grant
Deviates from the Norm	Grant
Employs intuition	Grant
Social Skills	Grant
Intellectually flexible	Grant, Keenan, Wong, ROTC
Manages time	Keenan
Critically examines	Keenan, Grant
Conceptualizes 2nd, 3rd and 4th Order effects	Keenan, Snider
Mental Agility	Krulak, ROTC, ARI
Analytical (skill)	ROTC
Information filtering (skill)	ROTC
Synthetical (skill)	ROTC
Research (skill)	ROTC
Cognitive Complexity	Snider
Deals effectively with Ambiguity/Risk	Snider

2) The <i>Cross-Cultural Savvy</i> competency attributes include:	Effectively
works across culture boundaries	AR 600-100
Understands cultural context	AR 600-100
Is sensitive to cultural factors in communication	FM 6-22
Engages different cultures	Grant
Posses cultural understanding	CCJO, Keenan
Knowledge of interagency capabilities	CCJO

- 3) The *Interpersonal Maturity* competency attributes include::
- |  |         |
|--|---------|
| Conveys the significance of the Work                                 | FM 6-22 |
| Creates and promulgates vision of the future                         | FM 6-22 |
| Negotiates for understanding, builds<br>consensus, resolves conflict | FM 6-22 |

Seeks and is open to diverse ideas and points of view	FM 6-22
Determines information sharing strategies	FM 6-22
Conveys thoughts and ideas to ensure shared understanding	FM 6-22
Present recommendations so other understand advantages	FM 6-22
IDs and adjusts to external influences	FM 6-22
IDs and accounts for individual and group capabilities	FM 6-22
Removes work barriers	FM 6-22
Recognizes and rewards good performance	FM 6-22
Builds Trust	Grant
Process facts	Grant
Build relationships	Keenan
Oral & written communication (skill)	ROTC
Interpersonal (skill)	ROTC, ARI

### Pentathlete Defined

The difficulty in defining the idealistic pentathlete is that seemingly every possible leadership verb can be used as a defining term. Existing literature uses the terms “adaptable leader,” “agile leader,” “pentathlete,” and “multi-skilled leader” interchangeably and inconsistently in context. AR 600-100, as noted above, does attempt to formally define pentathlete with a lengthy definition (Appendix D), but this definition too is inconsistent with the intent of the pentathlete model. An extensive list of verbs and adjectives creates an untenable skill set and further reinforces the incorrect notion that a pentathlete is a “Jedi-master” of every conceivable leadership dimension. Based on the background research above the following definition emerges as a possible definition of the pentathlete leader (Table 6):

Table 6. The Pentathlete Leader
<i>Pentathlete Leader</i> – (adjective + noun) 1. A tactically and technically capable combat warrior who is aware and adaptive to a complex combat environment; 2. A proficient, multi-skilled leader versed in the profession of arms and its role in achieving national goals; 3. An innovative thinker, self-aware, culturally astute, diplomatically aware, and a cohesive team builder; 4. Upholds the highest standards of duty, honor, integrity, and character.

Leadership and learning are indispensable to each other.

John Kennedy

### Infusion of New Competencies into the Army Leader Development Model

In recent years, scholarly research and thought has produced some tentative methods on modifying the Officer Education System. Predominately this research is in the form of strategic research papers conducted at the US Army War College. This section outlines the findings of the research conducted that determines methods to conduct education and training that support the development of pentathlete leadership qualities.

The 2005 Army Research Institute research paper determined that there are two principles to apply in any training method in order to assure that it is effective.<sup>73</sup> The first principle is to provide a wide variety of experience-based training enabling the individual to develop a comprehensive set of experiences in which to determine responses to new situations. Simulations and real-world exposure are noted as examples that provide this experience-based training. The second principle is to provide feedback



during the learning process to allow the student to assimilate lessons learned and apply new ideas.

### Institutional

Of the three development pillars, the institutional domain is the only domain that provides for a program of formalized training and education. It provides the foundations for officer and leader development. Conducted correctly, institutional education also provides individuals with a motivation and ability to conduct guided self-development outside of the institutional arena. Therefore, any institutional programs should integrate purposeful programs focused at the development of self-motivated life-long learners. A fundamental challenge then becomes identifying and applying methods that enable the individual to adopt the life-long learning process.

As noted by the Army Research Institute study, it is critical to establish a framework for officers early in a formal fashion. Students are more accepting of new knowledge and change when they are provided advanced preparation to link their old knowledge with what is to be learned. Pre-course organization tools are a method to achieve this. It is not simply a course orientation, rather it is a set of verbal, written, conceptual, and quantities goals that allow a student to pursue and overcome weakness. Such a process enables the student to focus goals on so-called mastery learning where the knowledge development moves beyond performance learning into the realm of cognitive association. To develop the adaptive leader additional tools are needed.

Several sources of research collaborate that discovery learning is a noted method of enabling the learning of adaptive skill set. It leads students to explore and create strategies to improve their own performance.<sup>74</sup> Simulations are an emerging method of

providing a breadth of experience in the discovery learning process and are shown to enhance decision-making skills. The addition of traditional field exercises, classroom training, and mentorship feedback also facilitate the discovery learning methods as they allow for the student to constantly adapt methods and solutions.

The goal of any institutional program is the subject material that is to be learned. Simply applying new methods of instruction will not solve the core problem proposed by this thesis. As noted throughout this chapter there remains a large emphasis on the instruction of small unit tactics in the pre-commission and post-commissioning process. Some research indicates that there needs to be a reduction of the emphasis on tactics at this level and increased emphasis on officership skills in general. This argument appears to hold merit since only 28% of all candidates receive commissions in combat arms branches.<sup>75</sup> Additional research is needed to determine if it remains appropriate to focus nearly all pre-commissioning education on small unit tactics when only a few will actually need it in their initial assignments.

How then do you teach a student to be more of an officer and less an infantry tactician? Several journal articles and thesis have attempted to answer this question at every level of leadership. It is difficult to distill the theories for application to junior officers since they do not yet have a solid foundation of experience in the various levels of war. In general, though, an increased emphasis on a variety of leadership techniques is nearly universal. Small unit tactics rely on directive leadership and hence pre-commissioning education focuses on this style of leadership. The evolving COE and need for pentathlete leaders shows that the Army requires leaders that inspire subordinates and influence others in a variety of conditions.<sup>76</sup> Therefore, institutional

focus needs to increase the education of science of human behavior, the art of leadership, and a variety of leadership techniques.

The Army's institutional pillar is dynamically linked to resources available such as time, money, facilities, and instructors available. As shown through this chapter the requirements of the pentathlete leader are likely to exceed the institutional pillar's ability to provide leaders with this requisite skill set. Attrition of officers with these skills is a concern as is the accession of officers with these skills. To encourage, maintain, and retain this skill set in officers is also a consideration. Awards based competition is a method to do this.

Additional bonus could be provided to officers that pursue and master a foreign language. The Defense Language Institute is a formal school that can provide foreign language proficiency but is unlikely to be resourced to do this on an Army wide scale. Bonus pay would reward officers who take additional schooling or self-study and are able to provide language skills to the Army in their duties.<sup>77</sup> In a similar fashion, bonus pay can be provided for cadets and officers that pursue and receive a targeted advanced degree that support the needs of the Army. Again, while programs such as Advanced Civil Schooling exist that provide this opportunity, the majority of the officer corps is not able to take advantage of this. Bonus pay should be considered as an incentive rather than an entitlement that encourages self-directed institutional learning.

### Operational

The operational pillar of officer development training is considered to be a "refinement" period where the officer applies his learned knowledge and skills from the institutional pillar. The operational assignments provide on-the-job training and

opportunities for repetitive learning through performance, assessment, and feedback from leaders that are more senior. This iterative process allows leaders to refine their skills, attitudes and behaviors. However, the quality of this development process is dependant entirely upon the environment in which the officer is assigned.

There exists a significant inequity within the Army between units and there is little to no guidance on the skills, subjects, and development process for leaders to provide to their junior officers.<sup>78</sup> Highlighted earlier in this chapter was the inadequacy of the OFS as a replacement to the MQS. Junior Officers and their leaders do not have a guidebook in which to development goals and programs. It is left entirely up to the experience of the more senior leader to develop an adequate program.

A positive climate that empowers young leaders is essential for the development of an effective operational development experience.<sup>79</sup> Young officers need to be encouraged to try new approaches to problems and allowed to try innovative approaches at problem solving. Senior officers should encourage open discussion about such ideas before execution so that junior leaders can develop critical analysis skills. Critical, though, is a feedback mechanism that allows officers to conduct honest self-assessments so they may learn and grow from that experience.

The small group mentorship model is a proven method that encourages developmental growth and teamwork. As discussed above, it is effective in developing awareness of institutional values, innovative methods, and cross-specialty cultural immersion. This method should not be confused with classroom training. It is specifically a targeted, guided mentorship method outside of an officer's specialty and relies on group dynamics as the catalyst for developmental growth. Such a method can

facilitate the implementation of a certification program with the officer corps as a validation of experience, proficiency, adaptability, and motivation.

Many sources also indicate that the operational pillar is best at introducing the development process of Cultural Intelligence; specifically, intra-cultural awareness. Presently it is most common to find a new second lieutenant assigned as a platoon leader for his/her initial assignment in the Army. In many aspects, this is a flawed process. Most lieutenants do not have any previous operational experience yet are placed in a position requiring a great deal of organizational leadership. The lieutenants have learned through institutional training how to lead a platoon but have not learned the organization's values, culture, or processes. A pentathlete leader, a professional soldier, is highly attuned to these organizational characteristics. Therefore, to inoculate these young leaders into the profession and as future pentathletes, it may be necessary to place them in supporting staff roles until such time they have adopted the values and culture of the unit and have learned by observing other leaders.<sup>80</sup> Then they will have the organizational experience required in which to best learn when assigned as a platoon leader.

### Self-Development

The self-development pillar is entirely influenced by the individual leader. In theory, it is in the self-development domain where leaders continue to enhance their knowledge and maintain their proficiency at skills learned in the institutional domain. Although Army doctrine calls for self-development to be both individual and unit structured, the author was unable to locate any formal process to guide, review, or approve a unit-based program. It can only be concluded that, unless a highly motivated

senior leader emplaces an effective program, it is up to the individual to seek out and develop his/her own program. The motivation of the individual is the foundation of the self-development domain since there is a lack of any concrete Army requirements for self-development.<sup>81</sup>

Very few researchers have attempted to resolve this conflict of the requirements for self-development and method to improve it. It is generally universally recognized that this pillar provides the best opportunities for individual thought and self-reflection to lead to the development of Bloom's synthesis level of cognitive comprehension. If the general definition of self-development is accepted then any foundation for the development process must begin with the institutional pillar and then be carried forward as part of a life-long learning process.

It is not uncommon for industry to provide self-directed targeted training and certification programs. The most visible example of this is the Microsoft Certified Professionals (MCP) program where an industrial supplier provides the methods, material, and validation to other organizations and individuals that utilize their products. It promotes within the information technology industry a method to control costs, maintain common knowledge, and improve industry wide proficiency. Microsoft facilitates this program with books, classroom education, computer-based simulation, mentorship, internet based knowledge sharing, and certification testing.

As proposed by the Army Research Institute, the Army can utilize similar techniques to facilitate the self-development domain of development. The researchers proposed three developmental tools: individual development plans and guides, portfolios, and self-reflection exercises.<sup>82</sup> The plan is a guided product produced from various

sources that forms the individual's own assessment of his/her strengths and weaknesses. This allows for the development of self-awareness and quantifies developmental goals that can be measured. When supplemented with a development guide specific for the individual's specialty, the guide then becomes a customized tool that benefits both the individual and the Army. To be most effective, a mentor should be available to assist and provide feedback to the student to reinforce the use of the plan as a developmental tool.

A portfolio is a tool that organizes information to guide the career development of the individual. While similar to the plan the portfolio is larger in scope and provides a framework for the individual to "collect, integrate, and synthesize"<sup>83</sup> his/her career goals. The research emphasizes there is no formal structure to the portfolio since it is a tool that facilitates self-efficacy and reflection. It should contain sections regarding background and goals, development activities, and reflections of those activities. A tool such as this should be used to facilitate proactive mentoring to avoid its misuse as a micro-management tool or disuse as an irrelevant process.

Self-development was also identified as the most successful pillar in development of intra-cultural awareness. While the Operational Assignments pillar is best suited for organizational CQ, the self-development pillar is ideal to introduce leaders to differing cultures outside of the Army. This includes such programs as study abroad, tourism, internationally based internships, international mentorship relationships, teaching abroad, or participating in humanitarian assistance programs. These have proven to be beneficial to corporations that develop potential leaders into corporate executives.<sup>84</sup>

The idea of using internships as a method to promote self-development of culturally aware leaders is not new to the Army. Programs such as the Army

Congressional Fellowship, White House Fellowship, Joint Chiefs of Staff Internship, interagency assignments and the Eisenhower Program provide opportunities for selected officers to work outside of the Army and develop CQ within the US Government framework. These programs are targeted at senior leaders (generally lieutenant colonel and above) and are generally not available to junior officers. In fact, the opportunities for participation in these programs have reduced in recent years primarily due to the effects of the Global War on Terrorism.<sup>85</sup> Regardless, though, exposure to such environments undoubtedly helped to improve the leader's interpersonal and officership skills. This supports the development of the pentathlete meta-competencies of *Aware Leader* and *Versatile Leader*.

#### Extra-Domain Development

The research also revealed a few topics of discussion closely related to the three pillars of leader development that do not neatly fit into the development model. Chief among these is the establishment of a formal continuing officer education system within the US Army. The primary topics of this paper and findings of the three pillars listed above support the concept that the existing educational system is inadequate to meet to the future challenges of the Army. The existing three-pillar structure is fundamentally flawed and an oversight function, such as a formal continuing education system, is needed to tie the operational experience and institutional education together.<sup>86</sup>

Any new system is likely to see resistance for implementation because of resource requirements and existing Army culture. Therefore, a grass-roots campaign similar to the foundation of CompanyCommand.com could act as a catalyst for the needed change to bring about such a system. CompanyCommand.com is a knowledge sharing web portal



developed by two innovative Army officers to share knowledge and lessons learned about the command of small Army units. It began as an unofficial knowledge management and bulletin board site that became widely accepted and beneficial to young officers.<sup>87</sup> The Army recognized the accomplishments of CompanyCommand.com and it became an officially sponsored website run out of the USMA.

Technology is a common theme in much of the research. Distance learning, knowledge sharing, and knowledge management are re-occurring themes. However, technology alone cannot solve the wicked problem of improving the leadership development model. In fact, unless knowledge is constantly reviewed, refreshed, and improved, technology-based solutions face imminent irrelevancy as the knowledge becomes obsolete over time. Therefore, any technology-based solution requires effort and accountability. Only the distance-learning model can do this without a significant investment in personnel to manage the systems.

A significant challenge exists in providing time and opportunities for education. The balance between the current needs of the Army and the future needs of the officer are often in conflict. With the country involved in a global conflict for the foreseeable future, it is prudent that the needs of the Army do come first. However, opportunity does exist with the advent of the ARFORGEN process. ARFORGEN, short for Army Force Generation, is a unit manpower model that assigns Soldiers and officers to it during a reset cycle and lock in their assignment to the unit for a number of years. A period of time does exist during the reset and assignment cycles where careful management of officers could yield the opportunities to attend educational programs.<sup>88</sup> However, a continuing

education process would still be needed during operational assignments until the next reset opportunity.

Many sources noted the need to tune the Army's officer assessment model from the present top-down system to a more comprehensive 360-degree assessment. The 360-degree method allows for the individual to compare his self-awareness with those of his superiors, peers, and subordinates<sup>89</sup>. This idea clashes with existing Army culture where senior officers subjectively rate their subordinate's potential and performance. The current model contains a potentially damaging bias that empowers the senior leader to favorably assess officers that are like-minded. A 360-degree assessment would provide the opportunity for junior officers to provide quantitative feedback to senior leaders and thereby force the assessment program to be honest and open in its approach to all officers. Oddly, the preponderance of research material relegated the 360-degree process only to senior leadership and reserves mentorship for junior leaders.

---

<sup>1</sup> Harvey, *Secretary of the Army Remarks (as prepared) CGSC Graduation Fort Leavenworth, Kan.* (accessed).

<sup>2</sup> Thomas Jefferson, *Transcript: Jefferson's Secret Message to Congress* [Internet] (18 January 1803 accessed 30 August 2007); available from <http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/lewisandclark/transcript56.html>.

<sup>3</sup> Harvey.

<sup>4</sup> Andrew J. Birtle and Center of Military History, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976*, CMH pub 70-98. (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2006).

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 15.

<sup>6</sup> Christina Madsen Fishback, "Doctrine in the Post-Vietnam Era: Crisis of Confidence," in *An Army at War: Change in the Midst of Conflict* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2005), 625.

<sup>7</sup> Romie L. Brownlee and William J. Mullen, *Changing an Army: an Oral History of General William E. DePuy, USA Retired* (Carlisle, PA: US Army Military History Institute, 1986), 186.

<sup>8</sup> Fishback, 619.

<sup>9</sup> Birtle and History, 480.

<sup>10</sup> Krulak.

<sup>11</sup> Petraeus.

<sup>12</sup> Wong, 11.

<sup>13</sup> Rose A. Mueller-Hanson and others, "Training Adaptable Leaders: Lessons from Research and Practice," ed. Inc. Personnel Decision Research Institutes (U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2005).

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>15</sup> *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 2.0*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Aug 2005), 24.

<sup>16</sup> *CJCSI 1800.01C, Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, ed. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (Washington, DC: 2005), A.A.2.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., E.B.1 to E.B.3.

<sup>18</sup> *JP 3-0: Joint Operations*, Joint Publication [JP] (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, 2006), VI.1.

<sup>19</sup> *FM 6-22: Leadership*, 8.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., paragraph 12.1.

<sup>21</sup> *AR 600-100: Army Leadership*, iii.

<sup>22</sup> *FM 7-0: Training the Force*, paragraph 1.7.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 22.

<sup>25</sup> *DA PAM 350-58: Leader Development for America's Army*, 19.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 38.

<sup>27</sup> The existing OFS documents are available online at:  
[http://www.army.mil/usapa/doctrine/OFS\\_1.html](http://www.army.mil/usapa/doctrine/OFS_1.html).

<sup>28</sup> Robert J. Pleban and others, "Assessment of the FY 05 Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) Phase 1: Instructor Certification Program (ICP) and Single-Site Initial Implementation," ed. Inc. Personnel Decision Research Institutes (U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2006).

<sup>29</sup> Charles A. Henning, *Army Officer Shortages: Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Services, The Library of Congress, 2006), Report. It should be noted that the USMA did indeed graduate 911 lieutenants that year. This is the same year cohort group that joined the academy shortly after the 9-11 attacks of 2001.

<sup>30</sup> *AR 210-26, United States Military Academy*, U.S. Dept. of the Army Regulation [AR] (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2002). p.13. The departments include: Behavioral Sciences and Leadership; Chemistry and Life Science; Civil and Mechanical Engineering; Electrical Engineering and Computer Science; English; Foreign Languages; Geography and Environmental Engineering; History; Law; Mathematical Sciences; Physics; Social Sciences; and Systems Engineering.

<sup>31</sup> *Cadet Command Pamphlet 145-1: Army ROTC Incentives Procedures*, 10 August 2007 ed. (Fort Monroe, VA: HQ, US Army Reserve Officer Training Corps, 2007). p. 51. The list of approved scholarship academic disciplines is also contained in this publication.

<sup>32</sup> *USMA Circular 1-101: Cadet Leader Development System*, 2006 ed. (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 2002), 3.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 47.

<sup>37</sup> *AR 145-1, Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps Program: Organization, Administration, and Training*, U.S. Dept. of the Army Regulation [AR] (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1996), 2.

<sup>38</sup> *ROTC Mission Statement*, [Internet WWW] (ROTC Cadet Command, accessed 25 Sept 2007); available from <http://www.rotc.monroe.army.mil>.

<sup>39</sup> GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, "General Orders No. 16: Designation of the United States Military Academy as a Direct Reporting Unit," ed. Department of the Army HQ (2006).

<sup>40</sup> The Senior Military Colleges are: North Georgia College and State University, Dahlonega, GA; Norwich University, Northfield, VT; Texas A&M University, Corps; College Station, TX; The Citadel, Charleston, SC; Virginia Military Institute; Lexington, VA; and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA.

<sup>41</sup> *AR 145-1; Senior Reserve Officer's Training Corps Program: Organization Administration, and Training*, U.S. Dept. of the Army Regulation [AR] (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1996).

<sup>42</sup> Cadet Command ROTC, *The Order of Merit List (OML) Process and the OML Model*(United States Army Reserve Officer Training Corps, 2006, accessed 24 September 2007); available from <http://www.rotc.usaac.army.mil/PA/OMLProcessModel1.doc>. The statistical OML Model is quite complex and beyond the scope of this paper to describe and explain. The percentage equation of 40-45-15 best represents this complex model.

<sup>43</sup> *AR 145-1; Senior Reserve Officer's Training Corps Program: Organization Administration, and Training*, paragraph 6.19.

<sup>44</sup> Edward Pitts, Sara Thompson, and ROTC Cadet Command, *Accessions (Selection and Branching)*(Headquarters, Cadet Command, 2006, accessed 24 September 2007); available from [http://www.rotc.usaac.army.mil/PA/Accessions%20LDAC\\_LTC%20Jul%2006\\_4.ppt](http://www.rotc.usaac.army.mil/PA/Accessions%20LDAC_LTC%20Jul%2006_4.ppt). The selection and branching process is also a very complex processes and beyond the scope of this paper.

<sup>45</sup> *Cadet Command Circular 145-05: 2007 Leader Development and Assessment Course (LDAC) - Warrior Forge (WF)*, (Fort Monroe, VA: HQs, US Army Cadet Command, 2006). 4; available from [http://www.usaac.army.mil/accw/TNG\\_camp.htm](http://www.usaac.army.mil/accw/TNG_camp.htm)

<sup>46</sup> *Cadet Command Regulation 145-3-1: ROTC Precommisioning Training and Leadership Development, Off Campus Training*, 1/23/2006 ed. (Fort Monroe, VA: United States' Army Reserve Officer Training Corps, 2005).

<sup>47</sup> Arthur T. Coumbe, Arnold Leonard, and Larry D. Brown, *ROTC Future Lieutenant Study* (Fort Monroe, Va.: U.S. Army Cadet Command, 1999), 29.

<sup>48</sup> *Curriculum Review Board VI IPR #4 Slides and Notes*, (4 January 2007 2007, accessed 9 September 2007); available from <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/6861176>.

<sup>49</sup> USAAC G3, *Approved BOLC Common Core Task List - March 07* [AKO] (2007, accessed 9 September 2007); available from [https://www.us.army.mil/suite/collaboration/folder\\_V.do?foid=5617187&load=true](https://www.us.army.mil/suite/collaboration/folder_V.do?foid=5617187&load=true).

<sup>50</sup> Pleban and others, vi and 70.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 72.

- <sup>52</sup> Ibid., G.2.
- <sup>53</sup> Ibid., 68.
- <sup>54</sup> *Cadet Command Regulation 145-3-1: ROTC Precommissioning Training and Leadership Development, Off Campus Training.*
- <sup>55</sup> *DA PAM 600-3: Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, Department of the Army Pamphlet [DA PAM] (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2005), 19.
- <sup>56</sup> Warren G. Bennis, *On Becoming a Leader* (New York: Addison Wesley, 1989).
- <sup>57</sup> Leight Buchanan, "Growing Your Own, the Next Generation of Leaders May Be Right Under Your Nose," *Inc.*, March 2007.
- <sup>58</sup> David C. Thomas and Kerr Inkson, *Cultural Intelligence: People Skills for Global Business* (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc., 2003), 14.
- <sup>59</sup> P. Christopher Earley and Elaine Mosakowski, "Cultural Intelligence," *Harvard Business Review*, October 2004, 147.
- <sup>60</sup> Daniel Goleman, "What Makes a Leader," *Harvard Business Review*, Nov/Dec 1998. Mr. Goleman has written several books and continues to conduct research on this topic. He maintains a personal website with additional thoughts and foresight about the effect of EQ in leadership at <http://www.danielgoleman.info>.
- <sup>61</sup> Daniel Goleman, "Can Emotional Intelligence be Learned," *Harvard Business Review*, Nov/Dec 1998.
- <sup>62</sup> Stephen R. Covy, "Shaping Experiences," in *Learning Journeys*, ed. Marshall Goldsmith, Beverly Kaye, and Ken Shelton (Palo Alto, CA: Davies-Black Publishing, 2000).
- <sup>63</sup> Leonard Wong and others, *Strategic Leadership Competencies* (US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2003).
- <sup>64</sup> *The ATLDP Officer Study Report to the Army*, (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2001, accessed); available from <http://www.army.mil/features/ATLD/report.pdf>. p. OS-3.
- <sup>65</sup> *FM 1-0: The Army*, U.S. Dept. of the Army Field Manual [FM] (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2005), paragraph 1.18. FM 1-0 discusses the BE-KNOW-DO model. The BE-KNOW-DO model is an older leadership model that was introduced in FM 22-100, the predecessor to the current FM 6-22. BE-KNOW-DO is still well embedded in the Army and is used extensively in Non-Commission Officer evaluation and training.

<sup>66</sup> *FM 6-22: Leadership*, paragraph 2.4.

<sup>67</sup> *The ATLDP Officer Study Report to the Army*, (accessed). OS-3.

<sup>68</sup> Wong and others, *Strategic Leadership Competencies*, 5.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>72</sup> The competencies listed here are compiled from a variety of resources. Often they appear multiple times but only the primary reference is listed. They are:

1 – “AR 600-100” - *AR 600-100; Army Leadership*.

2 – “CCJO” - Richard B. Myers, "Capstone Concept for Joint Operations," ed. Department of Defense (Aug 2005).

3 – “Grant” - Greg Grant, "Adapt or Die," *Government Executive*, 1 August 2007.

4 – “Keenan” - LTC Jimmie Keenan, "Developing the Pentathlete: The Army Congressional Fellowship Experience," ed. USAWC Strategy Research Project (U.S. Army War College, 2006).

5 – “FM 6-22” - *FM 6-22: Leadership*.

6 – “ROTC” - ROTC Future Lieutenant Study, Coumbe, Leonard, and Brown.

7 – “USMA 101-1” - *USMA Circular 1-101: Cadet Leader Development System*.

8 – “FM 7-0” - *FM 7-0: Training the Force*.

9 – “Krulak” - Krulak. *The Strategic Corporal*.

10 – “Wong” - Wong and others, *Strategic Leadership Competencies*.

11 – “ARI” - Army Research Institute: Mueller-Hanson and others.

12 – “Romaine” - MAJ Kenneth A. Romaine, "Developing Lieutenants in a Transforming Army," *Military Review* 84, no. 4 (2004).

<sup>73</sup> Mueller-Hanson and others, 9.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>75</sup> Compiled from FY2006 lieutenant accession data. 28% of accessions were allotted to IN, AR, and FA. 39% were allotted to combat support branches and the remaining 33% were allotted to combat service support branches.

<sup>76</sup> Romaine.

<sup>77</sup> John F. Burpo, "The Great Captains of Chaos: Developing Adaptive Leaders," *Military Review* 86, no. 1 (2006).

<sup>78</sup> COL Robert A. Tipton, "Professional Military Education for the "Pentathlete" of the Future," ed. Strategic Studies Program (US Army War College, 2006).

<sup>79</sup> Krulak.

<sup>80</sup> Romaine.

<sup>81</sup> Tipton.

<sup>82</sup> Mueller-Hanson and others, 19.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> Thomas and Inkson.

<sup>85</sup> Keenan.

<sup>86</sup> Tipton, 8.

<sup>87</sup> Eva Kaplan-Leiserson, "Learning at War Speed," *T+D, Army Society for Training & Development*, May 2005.

<sup>88</sup> Tipton, 12.

<sup>89</sup> Walter F. Ulmer Jr. and others, *Leadership Lessons at Division Command Level -2004* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2004).



## CHAPTER 5

### FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A good soldier, whether he leads a platoon or an army, is expected to look backward as well as forward, but he must think only forward.

GEN Douglas MacArthur

#### General

The purpose of this paper was to determine the educational and training focus areas to integrate into existing leader development processes to facilitate the development of junior leaders needed in the COE. The research analysis in Chapter 4 reveals several notable findings but not a simple nor elegant answer to the research question. Indeed, the research revealed foundational flaws in doctrine, pre-commissioning programs, and initial entry education that preclude a methodical analysis as proposed in Chapter 3. The research was able to determine focus areas, competencies, skill sets, and evolving junior officer leadership requirements. Additionally, the research findings are of great use in identifying recommendations to improve the leadership development establishment for junior officers.

Research shows that there is both an historical basis and a contemporary need for junior officers that possess a higher level of leadership qualities than those of the Cold-War Army. Secondly, it shows that significant discrepancies exist in the development of newly commissioned officers during pre-commissioning education, basic officer training, operational development, and self-development programs. And lastly, research shows that current Army leadership doctrine does not support the development of senior leadership-like skills that are required of future Army and Joint senior leaders. The

remainder of this chapter will discuss these findings in more detail and provide recommendations.

### Recommendations to Update Doctrine

The terms “pentathlete,” “strategic corporal,” “agile leaders,” “adaptive leaders,” and “multi-skilled leaders” are often not commonly defined, used interchangeably, and not used consistently within the Army. Indeed, each of these terms contains un-intended positive and negative connotations unique to the individual audience member. These abstract titles are evolving to little more than symbols that represent an intangible fact of the need for a new type of Army leader with a broader and more flexible skill set. Many would agree on the emergence of these new Army leader requirements. Unfortunately, aside from scholarly research and writing, there is little being done to add these requirements to the gestalt of the officer corps.

As the Army continues to update and refine new doctrine, it is essential that a singular noun and clear definition be used to refer to the new Army leader model as outlined in Chapter 4. Continued use of only the term ‘leader’ is unlikely to spur a transformational process. Adoption of a singularly distinct word with definition will aid in focusing the Army to begin the transformation of leadership development to meet the needs of the future. Pentathlete, agile, and adaptive are commonly used adjectives to describe the desired traits a leader should possess. Pentathlete is the most encompassing term found in the course of this research and contains agility and adaptability as distinctive components. Therefore, based on the research, the author recommends that the adjective pentathlete be adopted by the Army as a noun to describe the new leadership requirements model as proposed in Chapter 4 and summarized below. Senior

Army leader involvement must assure the old adjectives are abandoned and new definitions are adopted. A recommended definition for the pentathlete is in Table 4.

Table 7. Recommended Pentathlete Definition
<p><i>Pentathlete</i> – (noun)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. A noun used to describe leaders that possess the competencies and attributes required of Army leaders in an expeditionary-based Army.</li> <li>2. Leaders who are: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Tactically and technically capable combat warriors who are aware and adaptive in a complex combat environment;</li> <li>b. Proficient and multi-skilled leaders versed in the profession of arms and its role in achieving national goals;</li> <li>c. Innovative thinkers, self-aware, culturally astute, diplomatically aware, and cohesive team builders;</li> <li>d. Torchbearers of the highest standards of duty, honor, integrity, and character.</li> </ol> </li> </ol>

The current Leadership Requirements Model found in FM 6-22 does not adequately encompass this definition or all the desired competencies revealed in the research. “Leads, Develops, and Achieves” are an effective evolution from the BE-KNOW-DO model. However, over the course of the research, six additional competency groupings were identified that simply are not addressed in the current model. These groupings support the evolution of Krulak’s strategic corporal, joint guidance for future leadership capabilities, research of competencies needed of senior leaders, and competencies required while working in a global environment. A revised Leadership Requirements Model must be adopted for current and future Army leaders to meet these challenges. Figure 13, first introduced in Chapter 4, is the recommended model to use and each of the competencies are discussed at length in Chapter 4.




Figure 13. Objective Leader Metacompetencies

### Recommendations for BOLC

The foundation for the development of pentathletes is laid upon the experiences that are created early in an officer's development process. Pre-commissioning, early institutional training, and initial assignments are greatly influential. The discrepancies in the BOLC-1 phase between USMA and ROTC are quite noticeable even though they share a common goal. The research indicates that the ROTC program requires improvement in order to be an equitable commissioning source with USMA. Recommendations for improving this discrepancy are summarized in Table 8 and discussed below.

Table 8. Recommendations for ROTC
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Adjust scholarship award guidance to meet contemporary needs.</li> <li>2. Correct discrepancies in the National Order of Merit List: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Weight academic discipline and credit load in the academic apportionment for desired academically developed cadets.</li> <li>b. Reduce the weight of Warrior Forge in the military apportionment.</li> </ol> </li> <li>3. Reduce the emphasis on Warrior Forge as a capstone event and focus on realistic training/education to support initial assignments.</li> <li>4. Require attendance or provide financial incentives for completion of sequential foreign language courses.</li> <li>5. Combine USMA/ROTC leadership development systems under a unified or parallel command structure.</li> </ol>

The ROTC scholarship incentive program continues to emphasize technically orientated degrees such as engineering, science, nursing, and mathematics.<sup>1</sup> This practice is rooted in the need to transform the post-Vietnam Army into a more technically oriented force. There also exists an accession process to match degrees with Army branch requirements to “produce officers in academic disciplines that correlate with the specialty needs of the Army.”<sup>2</sup> As indicated in the research, the COE of Iraq and Afghanistan show that, perhaps, leaders with non-technical cultural, language, and people-skills are in greater need and that the current generations of junior officers are far more technically savvy than those of the past.<sup>3</sup> Serious consideration in redirecting scholarship money and incentives to other academic disciplines is needed to account for this evolving relationship between the needs of the Army and emerging capabilities of cadet recruits.

Additionally, the evidence indicates that the Army is not making the best use of cadets who receive ROTC scholarship funds. Other than a service commitment, there is no consideration given to branch assignments or duty status to these cadets. This lack of follow-through is most likely founded in the mathematical calculation of the National OML and subsequent accessions process. The OML simply does not account for cadets that have applied themselves in difficult academic fields and achieved a degree in difficult disciplines (such as engineering, nursing, and math). In any industry, a corporation would seek to return its investment by placing individuals in key assignments meeting both the needs of the individual and the institution.

Computation of the academic portion of the ROTC OML equation is not weighted. It simply represents the gross grade point average of the cadet and does not account for academic discipline, credit load, scholarship, or university. Cadets who were awarded scholarships based partially on potential are unfairly handicapped against cadets with lighter academic requirements. For example, in FY06, the average GPA for engineering students was 3.04 while general degree students were higher at 3.08.<sup>4</sup> The accession process then becomes biased and it appears that the Army does not actively seek a return on investment in the ROTC scholarships. This phenomenon is not relevant at USMA since it is a singular institution with controllable standards and a distinctly different accession system. Additional research must be conducted to determine the outcomes of this affect on the Army. However, the ROTC OML academic apportionment needs to be updated and weighted according to the difficulty of the academic discipline and required credit load.

Within the ROTC program, there is great emphasis on performance at Warrior Forge during the summer of the junior to senior year. As a result, training, education, and individual motivation is focused on learning to maximize skills that are evaluated so that cadets receive the highest score possible. This score is a large part of the military apportionment score of the OML. ROTC cadets do not have the advantage of an institutionally wide four-year developmental process and evaluation like their USMA peers have. As a result, the National OML computation is again biased and focused on the short assessment period given at Warrior Forge.

The emphasis on small unit leadership and infantry tactics is not entirely relevant for all Army lieutenants during their initial duty assignment. For example, combat support and sustainment platoon leaders are unlikely to lead infantry squads in combat. In fact, only 28% of commissioned ROTC cadets entered the combat arms branches of Infantry, Armor, Aviation, or Field Artillery in FY06.<sup>5</sup> Quickly the question arises: is ROTC properly focused in developing all officers to be successful in their initial assignments in the Army or just a few. As noted in the ATLDP Officer Study, a major contributing reason for attrition of junior officer is a failure to meet the expectations to lead Soldiers and little assurance of future success. Is ROTC failing the remaining 72% of officers who do not conduct small unit tactical operations and thereby causing the officer retention issues experienced? The pentathlete of the future must start off on the right track. To do this, ROTC must reduce the emphasis on Warrior Forge and develop a more appropriate military apportionment of its OML computation.

Many sources of research also indicate that the ability to speak a foreign language is greatly beneficial. The ability to understand a second language is indicative of

increased cultural intelligence and intellectual adaptability. The only requirement for language education in ROTC is that scholarship recipients take one semester of a major Indo-European or Asian language.<sup>6</sup> The ROTC program should make it mandatory or provide a financial incentive that all graduating cadets take two-semester of a foreign language to gain a basic level of proficiency. The constraint of the type of language should be adjusted since the COE are largely not confined to the Indo-European and Asian environments.

As noted in the research, ROTC Cadet Command is subordinate to the US Army Accessions Command, which in turn is subordinate to the US Army Training and Doctrine Command. The USMA is a Direct Reporting Unit to the Secretary of the Army. Background research shows that this organization structure saves resources and combines recruiting efforts between university ROTC detachments and local recruiting offices. However, two distinct leadership development systems have emerged. ROTC, focused on Warrior Forge as a capstone event, produces leaders focused on small unit leadership. USMA, focused on a four-year development cycle, produces leaders focused on being professional officers. With ROTC as the primary commissioning source, it becomes questionable as to why there are two systems with vastly different command and control relationships with senior Army leadership. If transformational change of future Army leadership with pentathlete skills is seriously undertaken, then it is essential that USMA and ROTC be equals in the commissioning process. A reorganization or parallel command structure needs to be considered.



As with all self-development strategies, care must be taken not to assume self-development will make up for the lack of deliberate institutional or operational development.<sup>7</sup>

Dr. Leonard Wong

### Recommendations for Continuing Education

The evidence demonstrates that the traditional three-pillar system of the Army Leader Development Model (institutional training and education; operational assignments; self development) is precipitously unbalanced. The Army began relying almost exclusively on the Institutional pillar and on-the-job training since the 1994 introduction of the Officer Foundation Standards system. The DA PAM 350-58 interpretation of the OFS effectively placed all developmental tasks in service school Programs of Instruction. Little guidance was provided on implementation of operationally based reinforcement or identifying self-development requirements. This argument is reinforced by the lack of published OFS Soldier Training Publications over the last 13 years since the implementation of OFS. Additionally, doctrine published since 1994 places a great amount of responsibility on individual officers to determine and execute their own self-development program to make up for any lack of operational domain development.

For officers commissioned after 1994, this effect is particularly harmful. These officers have not benefited from the guidance or self-development requirements that existed with the MQS system. As officers in these year-groups assume Battalion command responsibilities, they likely will lack the development provided under MQS and unknowingly perpetuate a continued breakdown of the operational and self-development pillars. An undesirable paradox is likely to occur in the next few years.

Junior officers, eager to learn and apply themselves, simply will not yet possess self-development intuition and their senior mentors will not possess the inherent background knowledge of being able to provide it through the operational pillar.

An update to DA PAM 350-58 and AR 600-100 is needed to address this breakdown of the two developmental pillars. Although AR 600-100 was recently updated, it does not address the OFS nor does it specify a construct for organizational leaders to follow in the development of junior leaders. If the OFS system is to be continued and used as DA PAM 350-58 intended, then it is essential that the Army recreate the fundamentals of the MQS and provide to all officers. Service schools have resources to institutionally implement programs supporting officer development; however, this school-centric model does little to serve officers who are in an operational assignment and need self-developmental guidance. Any resurrection of the MQS process must focus on both self-development and officership skills to be effective.

The re-introduction of a structured OFS/MQS system will pose several challenges to the Army. Foremost is a successful implementation that is embraced by the officer corps. Nearly a generation of officers has passed since OFS replaced MQS and any new methodology of officer development will need their considerable acceptance in order to be effective and provide a change. A method noted in the research that can be slowly implemented is the introduction of leader portfolios as discussed in Chapter 4.

Use of a shared, internet-based collaboration system as a portfolio development instrument can provide junior officers and leaders with the means to strengthen the operational and self-development domains. Table 9 lists the recommended components of a Leader Developmental Portfolio instrument. Such an instrument should be easy to

use and open enough to allow the junior officer and mentors the ability to modify it to their needs.

Table 9. A Recommend Leader Development Portfolio Instrument
1. Accessible by the junior officer, rater, senior rater, and mentors. Editable by the junior officer and mentor.
2. Contains Army officer leadership development goals and resource links.
3. Contains service branch specific development goals and resource links.
4. A continuous 360-degree evaluation of strengths/weaknesses.
5. A mentor/rater list of quantifiable goals and achievements.
6. Log to record experiences to specific events.
7. Junior Officer's background, goals, and career goals.
8. Social Networking capabilities to establish an informal knowledge sharing and discovery learning network.
9. The ability to easily participate in distance learning opportunities through web-based seminars or course lessons.

The operational pace of the Global War on Terrorism presents a challenge in providing opportunities for officers to pursue educational opportunities outside of their duties. Many sources in the research noted a need to implement a formal Continuing Officer Education System (COES). Implementation of a COES at this time would likely drain Army resources and attention away from supporting operations in the Global War on Terrorism and the author does not recommend such a program at this time. However, the Army can take several steps to encourage officers to seek educational opportunities that support the development of pentathlete skills. Table 7, below, summarizes the research results.

Table 10. Recommendations for Encouragement of Continuing Education
1. Army Education Centers should coordinate for unit level educational opportunities during ARFORGEN reset periods focusing on culture, language, and communications skills. Such training is easily incorporated into unit training schedules.
2. Additional Skill Identifies (ASI) should be awarded for completion of specific graduate degrees that advance the operational needs of the Army.
3. Incentive bonuses should be considered for officers that complete semester long college level language courses.
4. Advance Degrees should be considered a prerequisite for promotion to lieutenant colonel.

### Recommendations for additional research

Several recommendations for additional research have emerged through the course of the research analysis. Inclusion of these research areas is important to the debate about junior leadership development; unfortunately, they lay outside the scope of this paper to pursue. First and foremost, a survey of lieutenants and junior captains that deployed in operations in the Global War on Terror is needed to validate the new Army leader competency model described in this paper. Such a survey will provide a validation or disqualification for experience based competencies as they are used in the COE; however, a survey of more senior leaders would be required to validate or disqualify developmental competencies.

A statistical survey and analysis of the outcomes of the ROTC scholarship awards process is needed. The author was unable to uncover quantitative data that illustrated the career paths of scholarship cadets versus non-scholarship cadets versus USMA cadets. What were the results of the accessions process and did it meet the needs of the Army or

the desires of the cadet? Did they depart service later, sooner, or on average the same? What was the level of job satisfaction? Such a study would show the net results of the affect of the ROTC National OML process and the flaws noted in this research and the USMA CPS. An analytical study to improve the ROTC National OML and OMS is needed to assure that ROTC cadets and USMA cadets are receiving equitable consideration in the accessions process to account for degree variation, academic loads, and valid military assessment.

An historical case study comparing the pre-Vietnam, Vietnam, and post-Vietnam leadership development programs would be beneficial in determining how the military culture of officership changed during this period. Research material alluded too but did not provide any solid evidence that during this period the officer corps transitioned from being Army-centric to being service-centric. Why did this occur and what was the net affect on the Army? As the last generation of Vietnam veterans begin to retire from service does the service-centric officer corps need to be more Army-centric?

The Officer Foundation Standards System was created in 1994 as a replacement to the Military Qualification Standards system. Research into the effectiveness of the OFS in the services branches could provide quantitative data to determine if it is an effective tool within the services branches. Additionally, surveys of pre-1994 and post-1994 commissioned officers can determine the effectiveness of both systems and aid in the development of an updated OFS.

A significant shift in officer development will occur as the generation of Americans known as the “millennial” generation begins to complete college and enter the officers’ corps. Research at the Army War College shows that the millennial generation

has significantly different learning methods and motivations than the current generation of “Gen X’ers.”<sup>8</sup> An examination of the differences in the context of development of the pentathlete model described here would be extraordinarily useful in refining the recommendations described herein.

### Summary and Conclusion

The preponderance of research material and data shows that there is a gradual evolution of the needs and requirements of Army leadership. Post 9/11 military operations are providing the crucible experience for the current generation of junior officers who will undoubtedly pass on their hard-learned lessons as they progress in their careers. Army doctrine too shows a gradual evolution of the concepts and models of leadership; but doctrinal evolution lags the experiences and lessons learned of today’s junior leaders. This paper has identified the competencies that these junior leaders practice today and has attempted to present some solutions to overcome the doctrinal lag.

Leadership theory is intangible. There are few metrics to quantitatively measure or use to develop statistical models. The genesis of the pentathlete and strategic corporal began in the post-Cold War era and continues to evolve. A future observer will undoubtedly see this evolution in a more complex form that will require additional analysis to clarify its nature and determine its very essence. That essence is, after all, a leader who is capable of leading America’s sons and daughters in war and bringing them safely home. It is left to the leaders of today’s Army to establish, review, update, and implement the processes that assure this future.

---

<sup>1</sup> *Cadet Command Regulation 145-1: Army ROTC Incentives Policy*, (Fort Monroe, VA: United States Military Academy, 10 August 2007), 17.

<sup>2</sup> *AR 145-1, Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps Program: Organization, Administration, and Training*, 2.

<sup>3</sup> Kelly R. Fraser, "Manning the Future Force," ed. Strategic Studies Institute (U.S. Army War College, 2004). This monograph speaks to the topic of the "millennial" generation and their future impact on the Army in great depth. The impact of this generation must be taken into consideration but it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in depth. A trademark characteristic of the millennial generation is the fact that from birth they have been immersed in a technologically based society and are well adept at using and embracing technology in their work. In the past, the Army had to evoke processes, education, and incentives to recruit such individuals. This is no longer a requirement.

<sup>4</sup> Pitts, Thompson, and Command, (accessed). Slide-notes #3.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.(accessed). Computed from FY06 accession data.

<sup>6</sup> *AR 145-1, Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps Program: Organization, Administration, and Training*, paragraph 3.37.

<sup>7</sup> Wong and others, *Strategic Leadership Competencies*, 8.

<sup>8</sup> Fraser.

## GLOSSARY

Antiterrorism -- “Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces.”<sup>1</sup>

Asymmetry – “Dissimilarities in organization, equipment, doctrine, and values between other armed forces (formally organized or not) and US forces. Engagements are symmetric if forces, technologies, and weapons are similar; they are asymmetric if forces, technologies, and weapons are different, or if a resort to terrorism and rejection of more conventional rules of engagement are the norm.”<sup>2</sup>

Contemporary Operating Environment – the description of the modern battlefield exemplified by Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom; contains civilians, non-governmental agencies, other governmental agencies, multinational forces, non-state actors, terrorists, and media representatives; no clear distinctions between front line actions and rear echelons.

Conventional – “Activities, operations, organizations, capabilities, etc., of the regular armed forces of a country that are capable of conducting military operations using non-nuclear weapons, but excluding designated special operations forces.”<sup>3</sup>

Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN) – “Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”<sup>4</sup>

Counterterrorism. “Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.”<sup>5</sup>

Full Spectrum Operations. “Full spectrum operations include offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. Missions in any environment require Army forces prepared to conduct any combination of these operations.”<sup>6</sup>

Irregular Warfare. “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”<sup>7</sup>

Low Intensity Conflict. “Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are localized generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.”<sup>8</sup>



Military Education. “The systematic instruction of individuals in subjects that will enhance their knowledge of the science and art of war.”<sup>9</sup>

Network Centric Warfare – A theory of warfare that seeks to empower an information advantage to operational and tactical forces; enabled through robust information technology and robust networking of dispersed military forces.

Non-Conventional – “Activities, operations, organizations, capabilities, etc., for which the regular armed forces of a country, excluding designated special operations forces, do not have a broad-based requirement for the conduct of combat operations against the regular armed forces of another country. This term includes the employment of conventional forces and capabilities in nonstandard ways or for nonstandard purposes.”<sup>10</sup>

Officership – “Officership is the practice of being an officer. Commissioned officers are leaders in the Army inspired by a unique professional identity. This identity is not only shaped by what they KNOW and DO, but most importantly, by a deeply held personal understanding and acceptance of what it means to BE a commissioned officer, a leader of character in the Army.”<sup>11</sup>

Stability Operations. “An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”<sup>12</sup>

Strategic Corporal – “The most conspicuous symbol of American foreign policy and will potentially influence not only the immediate tactical situation, but the operational and strategic levels as well.”<sup>13</sup>

Three Block War – “Amorphous conflicts ... in which Marines [Soldiers] may be confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the span of a few hours and within the space of three contiguous city blocks.”<sup>14</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> *JP 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication [JP] (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, 2007).

<sup>2</sup> *FM 1-02: Operational Terms and Graphics*, U.S. Dept. of the Army Field Manual [FM] (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, Sept 2004).

<sup>3</sup> *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, Version 1.0*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Sep 2007).

<sup>4</sup> *Joint Pub 1-02*.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> *FM 3-0: Operations*, U.S. Dept. of the Army Field Manual [FM] (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2001).

<sup>7</sup> *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, Version 1.0*.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> *Joint Pub 1-02*.

<sup>10</sup> *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, Version 1.0*.

<sup>11</sup> *USMA Circular 1-101: Cadet Leader Development System*.

<sup>12</sup> *Joint Pub 1-02*.

<sup>13</sup> Krulak.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

# APPENDIX A

## COMPTENCY CROSS-WALK OF FM 6-22 AND AR 600-100

FM 6-22 Core Leader Competencies				No Direct Correlation to FM 6-22	
LEADS		DEVELOPS		ACHIEVES	
Establishes and imparts clear intent and purpose	FM 6-22	Fosters teamwork, cohesion, cooperation, and loyalty	FM 6-22	Prioritizes, organizes, and coordinates	AR 600-100
Uses appropriate influence techniques to energize others	FM 6-22	Encourages subordinates	FM 6-22	IDs and accounts for individual and group capabilities	AR 600-100
Conveys the significance of the Work	FM 6-22	Creates a learning environment	FM 6-22	Designates, clarifies, and deconflicts	AR 600-100
Maintains and enforces high professional standards	FM 6-22	Encourages open and candid communications	FM 6-22	Manages resources	AR 600-100
Balances requirements of mission with welfare of followers	FM 6-22	Encourages fairness and inclusiveness	FM 6-22	Removes work barriers	AR 600-100
Creates and promulgates vision of the future and limits of influence	FM 6-22	Expresses and demonstrates care for people and their well being	FM 6-22	Recognizes and rewards good performance	AR 600-100
Understands sphere of influence, means of influence, and limits of influence	FM 6-22	Anticipates peoples on the job needs	FM 6-22	Seeks improvement	AR 600-100
Builds Trust	FM 6-22	Sets and maintains high expectations	FM 6-22	Makes feedback part of the work process	AR 600-100
Negotiates for understanding, builds consensus, resolves conflict	FM 6-22	Accepts reasonable setbacks and failures	FM 6-22	Executes plans to accomplish the mission	AR 600-100
Builds and maintains alliances	FM 6-22	Maintains mental and physical health	FM 6-22	IDs and adjusts to external influences	AR 600-100
Displays character by modeling the Army Values	FM 6-22	Maintains self-awareness	FM 6-22	manage, lead, and change	AR 600-100
Exemplifies the Warrior Ethos	FM 6-22	Evaluates and incorporates feedback from others	FM 6-22		
Demonstrates commitment to the Nation, Army, Unit, Soldiers, Community, multinational partners	FM 6-22	Expands knowledge of technical and tactical areas	FM 6-22		
Leads with confidence	FM 6-22	Expands conceptual and interpersonal capabilities	FM 6-22		
Demonstrates technical and tactical knowledge and skills	FM 6-22	Analyzes and organizes information to create knowledge	FM 6-22		
Understands the importance of conceptual skills and models them to others	FM 6-22	Maintains relevant cultural awareness	FM 6-22		
Seeks and is open to diverse ideas and points of view	FM 6-22	Maintains relevant geopolitical awareness	FM 6-22		
Listen Actively	FM 6-22	Assess current developmental needs of others	FM 6-22		
Determines information sharing strategies	FM 6-22	Fosters job development, job challenge, and job enrichment	FM 6-22		
Employs engaging communication techniques	FM 6-22	Counsels, coaches, and mentors	FM 6-22		
Conveys thoughts and ideas to ensure shared understanding	FM 6-22	Facilitates ongoing development	FM 6-22		
Present recommendations so other understand	FM 6-22	Supports institutional-based development	FM 6-22		
Is sensitive to cultural factors in communication	FM 6-22	Builds team skills and processes	FM 6-22		
Competent full-spectrum warfighter	AR 600-100	Professionally educated	AR 600-100		
Experts in the Profession of Arms	AR 600-100	Lifelong Learner	AR 600-100		
Effective Communicator	AR 600-100	Builds Leaders	AR 600-100		
Demonstrates Character	AR 600-100	Builds Teams	AR 600-100		
Effective in leading organizations	AR 600-100	Physically agile	AR 600-100		
Effectively works across culture boundaries	AR 600-100	Mentally agile	AR 600-100		
Empathetic	AR 600-100	Understands cultural context	AR 600-100		
Empathetic and always positive	AR 600-100	Self-aware	AR 600-100		
Empathetic and always positive	AR 600-100	Empathetic	AR 600-100		
Empowers Trust	AR 600-100	Dedicated to lifelong learning	AR 600-100		
Confident	AR 600-100				
Sets standard of character	AR 600-100				
Sets standard of integrity	AR 600-100				

## APPENDIX B

### META-COMPETENCY DEFINITIONS

Meta-competency	Definition
Self-Awareness	“ability to understand how to assess abilities, know strengths and weaknesses in the operational environment, and learn how to correct those weaknesses.” <sup>1</sup>
Adaptability	“ability to recognize changes to the environment; assess against that environment to determine what is new and what to learn to be effective; and the learning process that follows...all to standard and with feedback.” <sup>2</sup>
Identity	a comprehension of one’s self-concept, self-identity, role as an officer, one’s values, incorporation of Army values, and an understanding of who they are. <sup>3</sup>
Mental Agility	cognitive ability to identify, interpret, adjust, improvise, integrate, prioritize, translate, and affect complex and changing environments. <sup>4</sup>
Cross-Cultural Savvy	“ability to understand cultures beyond one’s organizational, economic, religious, societal, geographical, and political boundaries.” <sup>5</sup>
Interpersonal Maturity	“accepting the character, reactions, and motives of oneself and others....recognizing diversity and displaying self-control, balance, and stability in all situations.” <sup>6</sup>
World-Class Warrior	a foundation of technical and technical competence; knowledge of military history and military art; possess insights to all aspects of full-spectrum operations.
Professional Astuteness	an understanding of Army officership and one’s self-concept as an officer; an acceptance of the Army’s ethics; and understanding of the role of a professional Army in American society. <sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *The ATLDP Officer Study Report to the Army*, (accessed).

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Wong and others, *Strategic Leadership Competencies*, 5.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 6.Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 7.Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> *FM 6-22: Leadership*, paragraph 6.3.

<sup>7</sup> Wong and others, *Strategic Leadership Competencies*, 10.

## APPENDIX C

### DA PAM 350-58 EXTRACT, APPENDIX B

Table 2 OFFICER LEADER DEVELOPMENT MATRIX			
PILLAR:	INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING & ED	OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS	SELF- DEVELOPMENT
RESPONSIBILITY	COMMANDANT	COMMANDER	INDIVIDUAL

Table ERR (LEVEL SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS)			
PRE-ACCESSION	-OFSI -CTLT*	-Summer Camp support	-Bachelor Degree -OFS I
LT	-OBC (verify OFS I for self- development & selected OFS II tasks)	-evaluate selected METL-related OFS II tasks	-OFS II (LT) -50% completion of foundation reading -maintain OFS I proficiency
CPT	-OAC (verify LT OFS I tasks & selected OFS II tasks) -CAS3	-ensure completion of Phase I, CAS3 -program to Phase II, CAS3 -evaluate METL- related OFS II tasks	-OFS II (LT) -100% completion of foundation reading -Phase I, CAS3 -maintain OFS proficiency -advanced degree*
MAJ	-CSC** (verify CPT OFS II tasks and comps)	-recommend for non-resident CSC for non-selection	-OFS III -maintain OFS I & II proficiency -COMPS (resident CSC) -advanced degree* -non-resident CSC

*Source:* Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-58: Leader Development for America's Army (Washington, D.C.: United States Army, 13 October 1994), 35.

## APPENDIX D

### AR 600-100 EXTRACT

**Pentathlete**

Pentathletes are multi-skilled, innovative, adaptive, and situationally aware professionals who demonstrate character in everything that they do, are experts in the profession of arms, personify the warrior ethos in all aspects from war fighting to statesmanship to enterprise management, and boldly confront uncertainty and solve complex problems.

*a.* A Pentathlete—

- (1) Is a strategic and creative thinker.
- (2) Builds leaders and teams.
- (3) Is a competent full-spectrum warfighter or accomplished professional who supports the Soldier.
- (4) Is effective in managing, leading changing large organizations.
- (5) Is skilled in governance, statesmanship, and diplomacy.
- (6) Understands cultural context and works effectively across it.

*b.* Pentathlete attributes are—

- (1) To set the standard for integrity character.
- (2) To be a confident and competent decision-maker in uncertain situations:
  - (a) Prudent risk taker.
  - (b) Innovative.
  - (c) Adaptive.
- (3) Empathetic and always positive.
- (4) Professionally educated and dedicated to lifelong learning.
- (5) Effective communicator.

*Source:* Army Regulation 600-100: Army Leadership (Washington, D.C.: United States Army, 8 March 2007), 18.

## APPENDIX E

### BOLC TASK LIST AS OF MARCH 2007<sup>8</sup>

TIER		r					
III		224-300-1000	A	I	I		
I		158-100-1110	P	I	I		
I		158-100-1134	P	I	I		
I		158-100-1135 Detainee Opns	P	I	I		
I		158-100-1282	P	I	I		
I		158-100-1260	P	I	I		
I		158-100-1230	P	I	I		
I		158-100-1181	P	I	I		
I		158-100-1150	P	I	I		
I		158-100-1250	P	I	I		
I		158-100-1271	P				
II		158-300-0040	P	I	I		
I		158-300-0030	P	I	I		
I		158-200-2000	P				
I		158-100-1111	P	I	I		
I		158-100-1132	P	I	I		
I		158-100-1170	P	I	I		
I		158-100-1272	P	I	I		
I		158-100-1240	P	I	I		
		158-250-1000	P				
		158-250-2000			A		
I		152-020-0030	P	I	I		
I		071-326-3049	P	I	I		
I		191-377-4250	P	I	I		
I		154-385-6263	P	I	I		
I		155-197-0020	P				
I		155-297-0010		I	P		
I		113-305-1001	P	P- SINCGA	I		

<sup>8</sup> *Approved BOLC Common Core Task List.xls*, (ROTC Cadet Command, 2007, accessed 9 September 2007); available from <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/7373689>.

				RS			
	PS #1. Collect References, Resources, and Tactical Radio Set						
I		181-431-1001 Detainee Opns	P	P	I		
I		181-331-1001	P				
III		181-231-1001	P	I	I		
I		061-283-6003	A	I			
I		xxx-xxx-xxxx					
I		052-192-1271	I	I			
I		301-371-1200	P	I	I		
I		301-371-1000	P	I	I		
I		TSP 071-7171 / B	A	P			
I		071-311-2025	P	I			
I		071-311-2007	P	P			
I		071-329-1006	P	P			
I		071-329-1030	A	I			
I		071-990-0006	P	I	I		
I		071-990-0009	P	I	I		
I		071-329-7017		P			
I		TSP 071-7174 / B	A	P			
II		071-325-4407	P	A			
II		071-325-4425	P	A			
		Under development		P	I		
I		052-192-1270	I	I			
I		052-192-3261		I	I		
I		052-192-3262		I	I		
III		052-192-1042	A				
		XXX-XXX-XXXX	P				
		TSP 071-7202		P			
		TSP 071-2075 /Ver 3	P	I			
		TSP NO: 012-GS-0001		A			
I		TSP 805-B-2017	P				



I		TSP 805-B-2018	P				
I		TSP 805-B-2019	P				
I		TSP 805-B-2021	P	I	I		
I		TSP 805-B-2022	P				
I		TSP 805-B-2023	P				
I		TSP 805-B-2024	P				
I		158-100-1285			A		
I		071-990-0005					
I		301-371-1050	P	I	I		
II		191-000-0005	P	R	I		
I		331-919-0146	P	I	I		
I		031-503-1036	P	A			
I		031-503-1035	P	I			
I		031-503-1015	P	A			
I		031-503-1013		A			
I		031-503-1037		A			
I		805C-A-1002	P				
I		805C-A-1003		P			
I		805C-010-0102	P				
I		805C-010-0104		P			
II		805A-FSC-1496	A				
II		805C-010-8015	A				
I		081-831-9018	A				
I		091-357-0002	A	I	P		
II		101-92Y-0002	P	I	I		
		181-301-0001	P			JAG	

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Approved BOLC Common Core Task List.xls* ROTC Cadet Command, 2007, accessed 9 September 2007; Available from <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/7373689>.
- AR 145-1, Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps Program: Organization, Administration, and Training.* U.S. Dept. of the Army Regulation [AR]. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1996.
- AR 145-1; Senior Reserve Officer's Training Corps Program: Organization Administration, and Training.* U.S. Dept. of the Army Regulation [AR]. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1996.
- AR 210-26, United States Military Academy.* U.S. Dept. of the Army Regulation [AR]. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2002.
- AR 350-1; Army Training and Education.* U.S. Dept. of the Army Regulation [AR]. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2003.
- AR 600-100; Army Leadership.* U.S. Dept. of the Army Regulation [AR]. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2007.
- Bennis, Warren G. *On Becoming a Leader.* New York: Addison Wesley, 1989.
- Birtle, Andrew J., and Center of Military History. *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976* CMH pub 70-98. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2006.
- Bloom, Benjamin S. *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: The Classification of Educational Goals: Handbook I, Cognitive Domain.* New York: Longmans, 1956.
- Brownlee, Romie L., and William J. Mullen. *Changing an Army: an Oral History of General William E. DePuy, USA Retired.* Carlisle, PA: US Army Military History Institute, 1986.
- Buchanan, Leight. "Growing Your Own, the Next Generation of Leaders May Be Right Under Your Nose." *Inc.*, March 2007, 42.
- Burpo, John F. "The Great Captains of Chaos: Developing Adaptive Leaders." *Military Review* 86, no. 1 (2006): 64.
- Cadet Command Circular 145-05: 2007 Leader Development and Assessment Course (LDAC) - Warrior Forge (WF).* Fort Monroe, VA: HQs, US Army Cadet Command, 2006.

- Cadet Command Pamphlet 145-1: Army ROTC Incentives Procedures.* 10 August 2007 ed. Fort Monroe, VA: HQ, US Army Reserve Officer Training Corps, 2007.
- Cadet Command Regulation 145-1: Army ROTC Incentives Policy.* Fort Monroe, VA: United States Military Academy, 10 August 2007.
- Cadet Command Regulation 145-3-1: ROTC Precommissioning Training and Leadership Development, Off Campus Training.* 1/23/2006 ed. Fort Monroe, VA: United States' Army Reserve Officer Training Corps, 2005.
- Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 2.0.* Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Aug 2005.
- CJCSI 1800.01C, Officer Professional Military Education Policy.* Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, ed. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Washington, DC, 2005.
- Coumbe, Arthur T., Arnold Leonard, and Larry D. Brown. *ROTC Future Lieutenant Study.* Fort Monroe, Va.: U.S. Army Cadet Command, 1999.
- Covy, Stephen R. "Shaping Experiences." In *Learning Journeys*, ed. Marshall Goldsmith, Beverly Kaye and Ken Shelton, 47. Palo Alto, CA: Davies-Black Publishing, 2000.
- Curriculum Review Board VI IPR #4 Slides and Notes* US Army Cadet Command: 4 January 2007 2007, accessed 9 September 2007; Available from <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/6861176>.
- DA PAM 350-58: Leader Development for America's Army.* Department of the Army Pamphlet [DA PAM]. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1994.
- DA PAM 600-3: Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management.* Department of the Army Pamphlet [DA PAM]. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2005.
- Earley, P. Christopher, and Elaine Mosakowski. "Cultural Intelligence." *Harvard Business Review*, October 2004, 139.
- Fishback, Christina Madsen. "Doctrine in the Post-Vietnam Era: Crisis of Confidence." In *An Army at War: Change in the Midst of Conflict*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2005.
- FM 1-0: The Army.* U.S. Dept. of the Army Field Manual [FM]. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2005.
- FM 1-02: Operational Terms and Graphics.* U.S. Dept. of the Army Field Manual [FM].

- Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, Sept 2004.
- FM 3-0: Operations*. U.S. Dept. of the Army Field Manual [FM]. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2001.
- FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency*. U.S. Dept. of the Army Field Manual [FM]. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2006.
- FM 6-22: Leadership*. U.S. Dept. of the Army Field Manual [FM]. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2006.
- FM 7-0: Training the Force*. U.S. Dept. of the Army Field Manual [FM]. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2002.
- Fraser, Kelly R. "Manning the Future Force." ed. Strategic Studies Institute, 38: U.S. Army War College, 2004.
- G3, USAAC. *Approved BOLC Common Core Task List - March 07* [AKO]. 2007, accessed 9 September 2007; Available from [https://www.us.army.mil/suite/collaboration/folder\\_V.do?foid=5617187&load=true](https://www.us.army.mil/suite/collaboration/folder_V.do?foid=5617187&load=true).
- Goleman, Daniel. "Can Emotional Intelligence be Learned." *Harvard Business Review*, Nov/Dec 1998, 97.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "What Makes a Leader." *Harvard Business Review*, Nov/Dec 1998, 93.
- Grant, Greg. "Adapt or Die." *Government Executive*, 1 August 2007.
- Harari, Oren. *The Leadership Secrets of Colin Powell*. New York: McGraw Hill, 2002.
- Harvey, Francis J. *Secretary of the Army Remarks (as prepared) CGSC Graduation Fort Leavenworth, Kan.* 2006, accessed 29 March 2007; Available from <http://www.army.mil/-speeches/2006/09/18/161-sa-remarks-as-prepared-cgsc-graduation--fort-leavenworth-kan/>.
- Harvey, Francis J., and GEN Peter J. Schoomaker. *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army* 1 February 2007 accessed 5 May 2007; Available from <http://www.army.mil/aps/>.
- Henning, Charles A. *Army Officer Shortages: Background and Issues for Congress*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Services, The Library of Congress, 2006. Report.
- Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, Version 1.0*. Washington, D.C.: Department

- of Defense, Sep 2007.
- Jefferson, Thomas. *Transcript: Jefferson's Secret Message to Congress* [Internet]. Washington, D.C.: 18 January 1803 accessed 30 August 2007 <http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/lewisandclark/transcript56.html>.
- Jordan, LTC Kelly C. "The Yin and Yang of Junior Officer Learning: the Historical Development of the Army's Institutional Education Program for Captains." *AUSA Land Warfare Papers* 49 (2004): 34.
- JP 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Joint Publication [JP]. Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, 2007.
- JP 3-0: Joint Operations*. Joint Publication [JP]. Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, 2006.
- Kaplan, Robert D. *Imperial Grunts: the American Military on the Ground*. New York: Random House, 2005.
- Kaplan-Leiserson, Eva. "Learning at War Speed." *T+D, Army Society for Training & Development*, May 2005, 14.
- Keenan, LTC Jimmie. "Developing the Pentathlete: The Army Congressional Fellowship Experience." ed. USAWC Strategy Research Project, 20: U.S. Army War College, 2006.
- Krulak, GEN Charles C. "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War." *Marines Corps Gazette* 83, no. 1 (1999).
- Mueller-Hanson, Rose A., Susan S. White, David W. Dorsey, and Elaine D. Pulakos. "Training Adaptable Leaders: Lessons from Research and Practice." ed. Inc. Personnel Decision Research Institutes, 51: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2005.
- Myers, Richard B. "Capstone Concept for Joint Operations." ed. Department of Defense, Aug 2005.
- Petraeus, LTG David H. "Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq." *Military Review Special Edition, Counterinsurgency Reader* October 2007 (2006).
- Pitts, Edward, Sara Thompson, and ROTC Cadet Command. *Accessions (Selection and Branching)* Headquarters, Cadet Command, 2006, accessed 24 September 2007 [http://www.rotc.usaac.army.mil/PA/Accessions%20LDAC\\_LTC%20Jul%2006\\_4](http://www.rotc.usaac.army.mil/PA/Accessions%20LDAC_LTC%20Jul%2006_4)

.ppt.

Pleban, Robert J., Jennifer S. Tucker, James H. Centric, Michael D. Dlubac, and Richard L. Wampler. "Assessment of the FY 05 Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) Phase 1: Instructor Certification Program (ICP) and Single-Site Initial Implementation." ed. Inc. Personnel Decision Research Institutes, 190: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2006.

Romaine, MAJ Kenneth A. "Developing Lieutenants in a Transforming Army." *Military Review* 84, no. 4 (2004): 72.

ROTC, Cadet Command. *The Order of Merit List (OML) Process and the OML Model* United States Army Reserve Officer Training Corps, 2006, accessed 24 September 2007; Available from <http://www.rotc.usaac.army.mil/PA/OMLProcessModel1.doc>.

*ROTC Mission Statement* [Internet WWW]. Fort Monroe, VA: ROTC Cadet Command, accessed 25 Sept 2007 <http://www.rotc.monroe.army.mil>.

Rumsfeld, Donald H., and et. al. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* [Internet]. 2006, accessed 6 February 2006; Available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf>.

Schoomaker, GEN Peter J. "General Orders No. 16: Designation of the United States Military Academy as a Direct Reporting Unit." ed. Department of the Army HQ, 2006.

Szepesy, James E. *The Strategic Corporal and the Emerging Battlefield* Tufts University, 2005, accessed 29 March 2007; Available from <http://fletcher.tufts.edu>.

*The ATLDP Officer Study Report to the Army Headquarters*, Department of the Army, 2001, accessed <http://www.army.mil/features/ATLD/report.pdf>.

Thomas, David C., and Kerr Inkson. *Cultural Intelligence: People Skills for Global Business*. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc., 2003.

Tipton, COL Robert A. "Professional Military Education for the "Pentathlete" of the Future." ed. Strategic Studies Program, 24: US Army War College, 2006.

*USMA Circular 1-101: Cadet Leader Development System*. 2006 ed. West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 2002.

Walter F. Ulmer Jr., Michael D. Shaler, R. Craig Bullis, Diane F. DiClemente, and T. Owen Jacobs. *Leadership Lessons at Division Command Level -2004*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2004.

Wong, Leonard. "Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom." ed. Strategic Studies Institute, 29: U.S. Army War College, 2004.

Wong, Leonard, Stephen Gerras, William Kidd, Robert Pricone, and Richard Swengros. *Strategic Leadership Competencies*. US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2003.

Wood, SGT Sara. *Soldiers Must Be Adaptive for Future, Army Chief Says* [Interview]. Washington, D.C.: 22 Feb 2006, accessed 11 March 2007  
[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2006/20060221\\_4263.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2006/20060221_4263.html)

## INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library  
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College  
250 Gibbon Ave.  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

Defense Technical Information Center/OCA  
825 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944  
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

Dr. Ralph O. Doughty  
Transformation Chair  
USACGSC  
100 Stimson Ave.  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Mr. Kevin P. Shea  
Department of Command and Leadership  
USACGSC  
100 Stimson Ave.  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

LTC Leonard E. Verhaeg  
Department of Logistics and Resource Management  
USACGSC  
100 Stimson Ave.  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

COL William M. Raymond JR.  
Director, Command & General Staff School  
USACGSC  
100 Stimson Ave.  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301